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Many lesbian and gay persons live in societies that subject them to severe
and gruesome forms of state-sanctioned violence-torture, ' paramilitary death
squads,2 involuntary "medical" electroshock treatment,
3 police gang rapes,4
I. In October 1994, Albanian police rounded up and then severely beat three members of the Gay
Albanian Society. The members were accused of belonging to an illegal organization. Police tortured them
until they named other gay persons. One of the three was taken unconscious to a hospital where he was
treated for multiple leg fractures. Gay Activists Arrested and Beaten in Albania, Reuters, Nov. 4, 1994,
available in LEXIS, World Library, Reuwld File; Gay Activists Arrested and Tortured in Albania, ACTION
ALERT (International Gay and Lesbian Human Rights Comm'n Emergency Response Network, New York,
N.Y.), Nov.Dec. 1994, at 2.
2. "In Colombia, 'death squads' routinely target and kill gay men and transvestites as local authorities
promote what they grotesquely term 'limpieza social'--'social cleansing'. The 'death squads' operate
without fear of prosecution: the gunmen themselves are often police officers ...." AMneSTY INT'L,
BREAKING THE StLENcE: HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS BASED ON SEXUAL ORIENTATION 1 (1994).
3. "Peter Chau [false name] shudders at the thought of being deported to Hong Kong, where he says
police continue to compile a 'pink list' of homosexuals and where the people named could be forced to
submit to 'cures' such as electric shocks once the British colony returns to Chinese rule in 1997." Doris
S. Wong, More Gays Seeking U.S. Asylum, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 7, 1992, at 13.
4. A Canadian court, granting asylum to an Argentinean gay man, documented the police gang rape
that ensued after he cast invectives against the police for not protecting gay persons:
The claimant was then set upon mercilessly. He was beaten with billy clubs and fists, stripped,
sodomized, blindfolded, tied to the walls in spread eagle fashion, given electric shock and then
was forced to listen to others being tortured in the same manner. Apologies for his [verbal]
outburst in the police station produced none of the forgiveness he soughL This only led to
another round of being raped, beaten, tortured by electricity, and left on the wall for a long
period of time. While he was unconscious he was dumped on the side of a road under a bridge,
naked, with his clothes next to him.
In re Inaudi, No. T-9104459, slip op. at 3-4 (Immigration & Refugee Bd., Can., Apr. 9, 1992) (on file with
author).
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and capital punishment.5 Not surprisingly, a number of these people have
sought refuge in the handful of countries now offering them asylum.6 In June
1994, the United States officially joined this group of nations through an
administrative decision designating sexual orientation as an eligible social
group category under U.S. asylum law.'
Despite the policy change, lesbian and gay refugees bound for the United
States are far from assured of gaining admission. According to U.S.
immigration statutes, an asylum applicant must (1) demonstrate past
persecution or a well-founded fear of future persecution (2) on account of his
or her race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or
political opinion.8 As a result of the new administrative decision, lesbian and
gay refugees can now more assuredly satisfy the second prong's requirement.
However, they may still face a difficult legal battle under the first prong's
required showing of persecution. 9 Due to a void in precedential guidance and
a legal grant of discretion, immigration judges and asylum officers may well
consider the claimed injuries too insubstantial to constitute persecution.'0 Two
5. Iran, Mauritania, and Yemen employ the death penalty for same-sex sexual practices. AMNESTY
INT'L, supra note 2, at 33-34. In a leading case, the Federal Administrative Court of the Federal Republic
of Germany granted asylum to an Iranian man who was in danger of being executed solely because of his
sexual orientation. Cases and Comments, 1 INT'L J. REFUGEE L. 101, 110 (1989) (citing BVerwGE, No.
19880315 (1986)).
6. The list includes: Australia, Belgium, Canada, Finland, Germany, the Netherlands, and the United
Kingdom. See INTERNATIONAL GAY & LESBIAN HUMAN RIGHTS COMM'N ASYLUM PROJECT, U.S. ASYLUM
LAW FAcT SHrT (1995).
7. By Attorney General Order No. 1895-94, dated June 19, 1994, Attorney General Janet Reno
elevated to precedent the Board of Immigration Appeal (BIA) decision in In re Toboso-Alfonso, thereby
classifying sexual orientation as a social group eligible for asylum status under U.S. immigration law. See
In re Toboso-Alfonso, No. A-23220644, slip op. at n.1 (BIA 1990) (interim decision no. 3222). Only BIA
opinions officially designated for publication obtain precedential value. These decisions represent a tiny
percentage of all administrative asylum adjudications, which include BIA, immigration judge, and asylum
office decisions. See LAWYERS COMM. FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, REPRESENTING ASYLUM APPLICANTS 11
(interim ed. 1994) (citing 8 C.F.R. § 3.1(g) (1994)).
8. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A) (1988). The relevant portion of the statute reads:
The term "refugee" means ... any person who is outside any country of such person's
nationality or, in the case of a person having no nationality, is outside any country in which
such person last habitually resided, and who is unable or unwilling to return to, and is unable
or unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of, that country because of persecution
or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in
a particular social group, or political opinion ....
Id.
9. Duke Austin, spokesperson for the INS in Washington, stated prior to the 1994 policy change, "To
say they are a social group is one thing .... To say they are a social group that is persecuted [in every
country] is another thing."' Wong, supra note 3, at 19. Daniel Kesselbrenner, a director of the National
Lawyers Guild Immigration Project, attributes both this attitude and the ."uphill battle"' facing lesbian and
gay refugees in the U.S. asylum process to general social and legislative intransigence. Id. He alludes to
social and legal intolerance evidenced in state sodomy statutes, Supreme Court validation of these laws in
Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), and the continued absence of sexual orientation in federal civil
rights laws. Wong, supra note 3, at 19.
10. This relatively standardless approach was criticized by the former Immigration and Naturalization
Service's General Counsel before his appointment. See T. Alexander Aleinikoff, The Meaning of
'Persecution' in United States Asylum Law, 3 INT'L J. REFUGEE L. 5, 6-10 (1991). Notably, Aleinikoff
advocates the expanded use of international human rights as a solution: "[I]nterational human rights law
should provide the starting point: thus 'persecution' under U.S. asylum law might be established by
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recent immigration court decisions,"' for instance, held that forced "medical"
treatment designed to alter sexual orientation did not rise to the level of
persecution.' 2
This Note takes the position that the incorporation of international human
rights standards into asylum claims gives needed shape to this currently
amorphous standard by focusing on one of the greatest threats facing lesbian
and gay refugees: involuntary "medical" intervention. 3 Although current
asylum law accepts the use of international human rights instruments in
establishing persecution, practitioners rarely invoke them in proceedings.
Drawing on the example of involuntary "medical" treatment, I hope to
demonstrate how international human rights standards can be employed
effectively, and thus to encourage their expanded use in this part of the
adjudicatory process.
Part I of this Note traces the doctrinal history of incorporating international
human rights principles into asylum determinations of persecution. It details
the judicial and legislative acceptance of this method and the possibilities for
future extension. Part II argues that subjecting lesbian and gay persons to
involuntary "medical" intervention violates the Nuremberg Code's international
human rights standards. Part III argues that human rights standards under the
Helsinki Accord independently proscribe forced "medical" sexual orientation
interventions. In future cases, if sexual orientation asylum applicants establish
that the treatment they fear is a violation of international human rights
showing deprivation of fundamental human rights or serious harm imposed as a penalty on the exercise of
a fundamental human right .... "Id. at 21-22.
11. In re Pitcherskaia, No. A-72143932 (Immigration Judge June 13, 1994) (on file with author); In
re Chau, No. A-71039582 (Immigration Judge June 14, 1993) (on file with author).
12. In Chau, a gay man sought refuge from the Chinese government's version of forced "medical"
intervention. See In re Chau, slip op. at 7. Chau testified that the present Hong Kong government would
imprison him for life if officials learned of his sexual orientation. He further established that the Chinese
government, which assumes control of Hong Kong in 1997, requires lesbian and gay persons to undergo
"electroshock therapy" and reeducation camp programs in order to "cure" them of their sexual orientation.
aI. at 6-7. Although this case was decided prior to the recent official policy change, it occurred after the
BIA case which formed the basis for the Attorney General's decision. The Chau judge specifically noted
that the issue of whether sexual orientation is a social group was not in question. Id. at 18. However, he
concluded that China's forced psychiatric procedures, though classifiable under "discrimination of various
kinds," fell short of persecution. Id. at 23 (citing U.S. Dep't of State Advisory Opinion).
In re Pitcherskaia concerned the case of a lesbian applicant who claimed a fear of institutionalization
in Russian psychiatric hospitals and of compulsory "medical" procedures, including the administration of
mind-altering drugs. See In re Pitcherskaia, slip op. at 12-13. The immigration judge denied her claim for
asylum. He considered Russia's involuntary institutionalization and forced shock treatment of lesbian
women to be "a question of degree .... [not] reach[ing] the point of persecution." Id. at 24.
13. Amnesty International records this practice as one of the worst forms of abuse facing sexual
orientation prisoners of conscience:
In some countries, lesbians and gay men in custody have been subjected to forced
"medical" treatment to change their sexual orientation. This kind of abuse may include electric
shock and other forms of "aversion therapy" or the use of psychotropic drugs.
... Reports of this kind of ill-treatment have been received by Amnesty International
regarding practices in the former Soviet Union and in China.
AMNESTY INT'L, supra note 2, at 19.
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standards, the second prong's persecution requirement should be considered
fulfilled and asylum granted.
I. INCORPORATION OF INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS STANDARDS INTO
U.S. ASYLUM LAW
Current asylum law accepts the legitimacy of incorporating international
human rights standards in resolving determinations of persecution.1 4 This
acceptance grew, in part, out of the historical context in which the international
agreements for the protection of refugees originated. With the Holocaust and
other Nazi denials of fundamental freedoms vividly in mind, the United
Nations (U.N.) member states designated the promotion of universal human
rights as a central goal of their newly established organization.' 5 Accordingly,
the U.N. General Assembly established the Human Rights Commission, drafted
the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights,' 6 and enacted a series of
other international human rights instruments. 7
During this period of heightened concern, the U.N. created an international
system for the protection of refugees under the 1951 Convention Relating to
the Status of Refugees.' 8 The Convention allowed its signatories to limit their
obligations to those refugee flows resulting from "events occurring in Europe
before January 1, 1951,"'9 but the subsequent 1967 Protocol Relating to the
Status of Refugees removed all temporal and geographic limitations.20 Both
the Convention and Protocol became binding U.S. law through initial
ratification in 1968 and further congressional enactments in 1980.21
14. Kulle v. INS, 825 F.2d 1188, 1193 (7th Cir. 1987); Singh v. llchert, 801 F. Supp. 313, 319 n.3
(N.D. Cal. 1992) (citing Forti v. Suarez-Mason, 694 F. Supp. 707 (N.D. Cal. 1988)); In re Laipenieks, 18
I. & N. Dec. 433, 457 (1983).
15. See Richard B. Bilder, An Overview of International Human Rights Law, in GUIDE TO
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICE 3,4-6 (Hurst Hannum ed., 2d ed. 1992) (describing emergence
of universal human rights after World War I).
16. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, U.N. Res. 217, U.N. GAOR 3d Sess., reprinted in
1948-1949 U.N.Y.B. 535, U.N. Sales No. 1950111.
17. The list includes: The Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide,
adopted Dec. 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277; European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221; Convention on the Political Rights of Women,
done Mar. 31, 1953, 27 U.S.T. 1909, 193 U.N.T.S. 135; The International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, adopted Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171; The American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22,
1969, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123.
18. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, 19 U.S.T. 6259, 189 U.N.T.S. 152
[hereinafter Convention].
19. Id. art. 1, para. A, cl. 2; para. B., cl. l(a).
20. Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, done Jan. 31, 1967, art. 1, 19 U.S.T. 6223, 606
U.N.T.S. 267 [hereinafter Protocol].
21. See INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421,436 (1987) ("If one thing is clear from the legislative
history of the new definition of 'refugee,' and indeed the entire 1980 Act, it is that one of Congress's
primary purposes was to bring United States refugee law into conformance with the 1967 United Nations
Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees...."). Decisions of U.S. courts and the BIA also reveal a long
avowed commitment to both the Protocol and Convention. See In re Chen, No. A-26219652 (BIA 1989)
(interim decision no. 3104); In re Acosta, No. A-24159781 (BIA 1985) (interim decision no. 2986).
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The Convention's framers declined to codify a definition of the
"persecution" from which refugees should be offered asylum. Yet there are two
strong indications that international human rights standards were intended to
help fill this interpretive void. First, the Convention's preamble introduced the
agreement as a measure to protect individuals from violations of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights.22 Second, the United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the organization responsible for
supervising and assisting the implementation of the Convention and Protocol,
prescribed international human rights standards as a suggested yardstick for
determining whether a foreign state practice constitutes "persecution." The
UNHCR's advice is found in its main publication, the Handbook on
Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status Under the 1951
Convention and the 1967 Protocol Relating to, the Status of Refugees
(Handbook).3 The Handbook states that "recourse may usefully be had to the
principles set out in various international instruments relating to human rights,
in particular the International Covenants on Human Rights, which contain
binding commitments for the States parties and are instruments to which many
States parties to the 1951 Convention have acceded." 24
In asylum cases, U.S. courts often rely on the Handbook for guidance,'
a practice endorsed by the U.S. Supreme Court in INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca.26
The Cardoza-Fonseca Court acknowledged that "in interpreting the Protocol's
definition of 'refugee' we are further guided by the analysis set forth in
the... [Handbook]."'27 The Court determined that, although the Handbook
22. The first words of the Convention's Preamble read: "Considering that the Charter of the United
Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights approved on 10 December 1948 by the General
Assembly have affirmed the principle that human beings shall enjoy fundamental rights and freedoms
without discrimination ...." Convention, supra note 18, pmbl.
23. Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status Under the 1951 Convention
and 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, Office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees,
U.N. Doc. HCR/PRO/4 (1979) [hereinafter Handbook].
24. Id. ch. U.B(2)d § 60. The Handbook first recognizes that "national authorities may frequently have
to take decisions by using their own national legislation as a yardstick" and then advises the use of
international standards as an alternative measuring tool. Id. This alternative method may help resolve other
questions that are unique to sexual orientation claims. Under sexual orientation claims, adjudicators and
practitioners conceivably will feel the need to reconcile assessments that foreign state practices constitute
persecution with the Supreme Court's constitutional validation of Georgia's sodomy statute in Bowers v.
Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986). Under the Handbook's suggestion, the use of international standards rather
than state legislation as a gauge may offer the more "objective" test for resolving this question.
This Note does not pursue further discussion of Bowers. Substantial legal scholarship on sexual
orientation and asylum law already addresses the problem of reconciling Bowers with general possibilities
of foreign state persecution. See Suzanne Goldberg, Give Me Liberty or Give Me Death: Political Asylum
and the Global Persecution of Lesbians and Gay Men, 26 CORNELL INT't L. 605 (1993); T. David Parish,
Note, Membership in a Particular Social Group Under the Refugee Act of 1980: Social Identity and the
Legal Concept of the Refugee, 92 COLuM. L. REv. 923, 950-53 (1992).
25. See McMullen v. INS, 658 F. 2d 1312, 1319 (9th Cir. 1981); In re Frentescu, 18 I. & N. Dec. 244,
246 (BIA 1982); In re Rodriguez-Palma, 17 I. & N. Dec. 465, 468 (BIA 1980).
26. 480 U.S. 421 (1987).
27. Id. at 438-39.
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is not legally binding, it "provides significant guidance in construing the
Protocol" and has "been widely considered useful in giving content to the
obligations that the Protocol establishes."28 The persuasive authority of the
Handbook and its recommendation that international human rights standards
be used to evaluate claims of persecution provide foundational support to the
developing judicial and administrative practice of incorporation.29
Congressional pronouncements have also evinced support for incorporating
international human rights principles into this aspect of asylum law. Such
approval appears, for example, in the legislative history of the Holtzman
Amendment,30 which removed the loophole in immigration law that had
previously allowed the legal entry of past agents of Nazi persecution.3' The
legislative history demonstrates strong support for the unfolding case law's
incorporation of international norms into interpretations of "persecution":
In applying the "persecution" provisions of this bill, it is the intention
of the committee that determinations be made on a case-by-case basis
in accordance with the case law that has developed under the INA
sections heretofore cited, as well as international material on the
subject such as the opinions of the Nuremberg tribunals.3 2
The evolving doctrine of international incorporation, now endorsed by
legislative sanction, has found further judicial expression in a succession of
asylum decisions. These cases rely on human rights standards set forth in the
Nuremberg tribunals,33 the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,34 and
congressional legislation.35 INS offices have also embraced the use of
international human rights principles in their determinations of persecution.36
28. Id. at 439 n.22.
29. The practice of incorporation here refers to immigration judgments that import interational human
rights standards to determine whether certain events and practices constitute persecution. Reliance on
international human rights instruments may occur in court decisions, asylum office determinations, or in
the arguments submitted by the parties represented in a case.
30. 8 U.S.C. §125l(a)(19) (1988).
31. See id.
32. H.R. REP. NO. 1452, 95th Cong., 2nd Sess. 7 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4700, 4706
(emphasis added). This same excerpt of legislative history was cited with approval in In re Laipenieks, 18
I. & N. Dec. 433, 457 (BIA 1983).
33. See Kulle v. INS, 825 F2d 1188, 1193 (7th Cir. 1987); In re Laipenieks, 18 I. & N. Dec. at 433.
34. See Singh v. Ilchert, 801 F. Supp. 313, 319 n.3 (N.D. Cal. 1992) (relying on international law in
finding that brutalities suffered at hands of Indian police constituted persecution).
35. In re Chang, No. A-27202715 (BIA 1989) (interim decision no. 3107). In Chang, the Board
suggested that involuntary sterilization and coerced abortions are violations of internationally recognized
human rights and thus satisfy the persecution prong. The Board held, however, that Mr. Chang failed to
demonstrate such acts were targeted against him on account of his political opinion, membership in a social
group, race, religion, or nationality. The Board recognized these practices as international human rights
violations due to congressional legislation adding them to the scope of human rights violations the State
Department is required to investigate before approval of international development funds. Id slip op. at n.4
(citing Foreign Relations Authorization Act, tit. I, § 127(1), 101 Stat. 1342 (1987)); see also In re G-, No.
A-72761974 (BIA 1993) (interim decision no. 3215).
36. One section of the INS Basic Law Manual provides a detailed explanation of the role and influence
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Given the willingness of the legal system to incorporate international
human rights principles in this area, future sexual orientation claims might be
strengthened through the use of such international standards. In the recent case
of In re Pitcherskaia, the court denied asylum to a Russian lesbian refugee
facing persecution in the form of "medical" interventions-institutionalization,
electroshock treatment, and mind-altering drugs.37 It is a productive exercise
to consider whether the initial outcome of In re Pitcherskaia would have been
different if this Note's approach had been taken, and we will therefore revisit
this question at several points in the Note.38 The following two parts take up
two international human rights instruments, the Nuremberg Code and the
Helsinki Accord, respectively, and apply their standards to cases of involuntary
"medical" intervention. My selection of these human rights instruments and
this form of persecution is meant to be illustrative rather than exhaustive.39
of international law. See IMMIGRATION & NATURALIZATION SERV., BASIC LAW MANUAL: ASYLUM 11-13
(1991). A subsequent section, entitled "Defining Persecution," refers to "basic human rights" and
"customary international law" standards as alternative gauges of persecution. Id. at 20-21; see Conversation
with Joseph Langlois, Director of the INS New York Asylum Office, in New Haven, Conn. (Apr. 6, 1995).
Director Langlois said asylum offices are both willing and competent to consider international human rights
standards. According to Langlois, the confidentiality of these proceedings enables adjudicators to avoid
concerns regarding foreign affairs implications since determinations based on international human rights
standards would be shielded from the applicant's foreign state. Id.
37. In re Pitcherskaia, No. A-7214393 (Immigration Judge June 13, 1994).
38. In re Pitcherskaia has been appealed and argued before the BIA and as of mid-September 1995
had been awaiting the Board's decision for over five months. Telephone Interview with Suzanne Goldberg,
Legal Counsel, Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund (Sept. 13, 1995).
39. The application of international standards may serve claims of persecution other than involuntary
medical treatment. Notably, a recent decision by the U.N. Human Rights Committee (UNHRC) with regard
to Tasmania's sodomy laws would help support many asylum cases based on state curtailment of
consensual same-sex sexual practices. See U.N. GAOR, Hum. Rts. Comm., 50th Sess., U.N. Doe.
CCPR/C/50/D/488/1992 (1994) (on file with author). The decision found that Tasmania's sodomy statutes
were incompatible with its human rights obligations under Article 17 of the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights, which states that "[n]o one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with
his privacy, family, home or correspondence." Id. at 11-12. This decision agrees with three major rulings
by the European Court of Human Rights, each separately invalidating state criminaization of private same-
sex sexual practices as abrogations of the European Convention on Human Rights, Article 8, which reads:
"Everyone has the right to his private and family life, his home and his correspondence." European
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, supra note 17, art. 8. The
cases are: Modinos v. Cyprus, 259 Eur. Ct. H.RL (ser. A) (1993); Norris v. Ireland, 142 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser.
A) (1987); Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, 45 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1981). The virtual duplication of these
norms in other multilateral treaties and covenants also bolsters asylum claims made on these grounds.
Consider the parallel provisions of other international human rights instruments. The Universal Declaration
of Human Rights, Article 12 states: "No one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy,
family, home or correspondence." Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 16, art. 12. The
American Convention on Human Rights, Article IH(2) requires: "No one may be the object of arbitrary or
abusive interference with his private life, his family, his home or his correspondence, or of unlawful attacks
on his honor or reputation." The American Convention on Human Rights, supra note 17, art. HI(2).
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II. HISTORICAL UNDERPINNINGS OF THE REFUGEE CONVENTION AND
THE NUREMBERG CODE
Nazi Germany's use of involuntary "medical" practices as a form of
persecution is highly relevant to the present asylum claims of many lesbian and
gay refugees. First, these practices, as part and parcel of "the events occurring
in Europe before 1 January 1951,,,40 helped produce and hence were covered
under the 1951 Refugee Convention. Second, these practices received extensive
review by the Nuremberg Tribunal. As such, the discussion of these practices
constituted a relatively major section of the Nuremberg Code, establishing new
human rights norms for "medical" procedures perpetrated on unwilling
subjects. Consequently, two separate foundations exist for considering
involuntary "medical" procedures as a form of persecution under asylum law:
(1) correlations between historical conditions underpinning the 1951 Refugee
Convention and current forms of persecution; and (2) applicable provisions of
the Nuremberg Code. Courts are perhaps better suited to address the latter as
this primarily entails consideration of trial documents and legal opinions.
Nevertheless, reviewing the historical setting offers a legally cognizable, if not
a necessary, appreciation for the type of persecution prohibited by the
international refugee treaties.
A. Historical Correlations Between Nazi Persecution and
Contemporary Events
1. A Description of the Correlative Approach
In asylum cases, adjudicatory bodies may readily employ a historical
correlative approach as persuasive argument. The reasoning is straightforward:
If certain events in Europe gave rise to and thus were covered by the Refugee
Convention, the contemporary correlatives of these events should receive the
Convention's same protections. 41 This analytic connection is inescapable in
sexual orientation claims because the Nazi treatment of lesbian and gay
persons and members of other targeted groups is inextricably linked, first, to
concepts such as "genocide" and "crimes against humanity" and, second, to
human rights instruments such as the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights.42 The legacy of World War II thus shapes and guides any interpretive
understanding of "persecution" under asylum law. For example, in Dwomoh
40. Convention, supra note 18, art. l(B)(1)a.
41. Correlative reasoning may be seen as a logical outgrowth of the Protocol's removal of time and
place restrictions. Because the Protocol codified these alterations but left the definition of persecution
unchanged, perhaps the clearest group of eligible asylees became those individuals undergoing the same
forms of persecution prohibited under the original Convention but in a different location or age.
42. See PETER R. BAEHR, THE ROLE OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN FOREIGN POLICY 5 (1994).
[Vol. 105: 255
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v. Sava, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York
considered the refugee protections for individuals who carried out resistance
activities against the Nazi regime as an instrumental historical guide for
determining the proper scope of present-day asylum guarantees.43
Notably, the correlative approach steered both Canadian and German
courts in their initial establishment of sexual orientation asylum eligibility; they
grounded their decisions in the historical roots of the Convention and the
specific Nazi practices perpetrated against sexual dissidents.'
Although the correlative approach has assisted liberal interpretations of
refugee protection, it may also operate to restrict access to asylum. For
example, BIA Member Michael Heilman's concurring opinion in In re R- used
a form of the correlative technique but deployed it in order to deny a request
for asylum.4" In this case, Heilman deemed the applicant to be free from
persecution in large part because of the lack of historical correlations between
the treatment of the applicant's religious group in his country and the treatment
of Jews in Nazi Germany.46 This judicial maneuver requires bending the laws
of elementary logic. Although a correlation signifies the existence of
persecution, the absence of such a correlation does not demonstrate its lack.47
43. See Dwomoh v. Sava, 696 F. Supp. 970, 976 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
44. See In re Inaudi, No. T-9104459 (Immigration & Refugee Bd., Can., Apr. 9, 1992). The Canadian
court relied on Germany's leading case, which, three years earlier, had deemed sexual orientation
persecution an eligible basis for asylum due, in part, to the corresponding Nazi treatment of sexual
dissidents. Id. slip op. at 5 ("Pointing to the persecution of homosexuals in the concentration camps of the
Third Reich, the [German asylum] court held that homosexuality could be considered as an attribute that
could be grounds for asylum... "). The German Administrative Court granted asylum to a gay man at
risk of execution in Iran due to his sexual orientation. Cases and Comments, supra note 5, at 110 (1989);
see also Goldberg, supra note 24 (discussing influence of Third Reich legacy on asylum grants of sexual
orientation eligibility).
45. See In re R-, No. A-70105328 (BIA 1992) (interim decision no. 3195) (Heilman, concurring).
46. See id Heilman reasoned that treatment of Sikhs by the Indian government failed to constitute
"persecution" because of Sikh relationships with the national government that did not exist between Hitler
and the Jews.
47. This semantic detail carries particular significance also for the general purposes of this Note.
Arguing for international human rights standards as an index for persecution is a separate enterprise from
applying these standards as a dispositive litmus test. In other words, if a state action breaches international
human rights standards it should, by definition, constitute persecution. It would be a misuse of this
approach to argue that a lack of international human rights violations precludes the existence of persecution
by definition. Guarding against this co-optation requires progressive vigilance and adherence to elementary
logic.
Heilman's misappropriation of the correlative method is perhaps more a demonstration of a rhetorical
ploy than a systematized methodology. Although these two modalities of reasoning share a conceptual
overlap, the correlative approach advised by this Note tends more towards the latter--the application of a
regulatory principle. As a juridical device, it extends beyond mere rhetorical analogies to Nazism. It
recognizes the rootedness of Nazi practices in forming the understanding of international human rights, the
impetus for the Convention, and the definition of persecution itself. This approach requires a fairly rigorous
inquiry into Nazi practices and a close match-up for the correlative results to be triggered.
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2. Correlations for Sexual Orientation Persecution
The correlative approach should aid the articulation and evaluation of
sexual orientation asylum claims under the required showing of persecution.48
In practice, applicants may claim that certain exercises of state power
constitute persecution by matching the present-day foreign state action with the
corresponding actions undertaken by the Nazi regime. For example, in 1935,
the Third Reich expanded the penal code's Paragraph 175, which had
originally criminalized anal intercourse between males, to include all forms of
male same-sex contact.49 "[T]he courts subsequently broadened the
application to a point where even a kiss or purely visual contact became
punishable."50 This history correlates, for example, with recent events in
Nicaragua, where the judiciary has validated the expanded definition of same-
sex criminal activity to include speech acts.5' Nicaragua's new criminal code
now provides for a three-year prison term for anyone who "'induces, promotes,
propagandises or practices in scandalous form concubinage between two people
of the same sex.' ,
52
Similarly, it is startling to compare the following two accounts, the first,
of events that occurred under the Third Reich, the second, of practices in
contemporary China:
It was only during the Olympic Games of 1936 in Berlin that Hitler
stage-managed a brief, deceptive lull for the benefit of international
observers. Still, at the same time the persecution of homosexuals was
stepped up in massive bar raids, in order to present visiting athletes
and journalists with a "morally clean" Germany. These raids greatly
increased the number of homosexual concentration camp inmates.5 3
Gays also suffer police harassment and arrest when the authorities
decide to clear the streets ahead of an important visit by foreign
dignitaries.
48. Since standing precedent recognizes sexual orientation as an eligible social group, in part based
on the relation between lesbian and gay persons and the Nazi regime, it stands to reason that the form of
treatment lesbian and gay persons experienced under the Nazi regime should produce similar legal results.
49. Erwin J. Haeberle, Swastika, Pink Triangle, and Yellow Star: The Destruction of Sexology and the
Persecution of Homosexuals in Nazi Germany, in HIDDEN FROM HISTORY: RECLAIMING THE GAY &
LESBIAN PAST 365, 370 (Martin Bauml Duberman et a. eds., 1989).
50. Id.
51. See Peter Tatchell, Theological Succourfor Bigots Everywhere, THE INDEPENDENT (London), May
31, 1994, at 15.
52. Id. (describing Nicaragua's criminal code).
53. Haeberle, supra note 49, at 370.
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Last August, in the run-up to the East Asia Disabled Games,
Peking Police arrested 200 homosexuals. Activists say some were
released after paying a fine and promising to stay off the streets until
the games ended. Others remained in custody for weeks. 4
The evident similarity of these events reveals a shared link to the definition of
persecution.
3. Correlations Specific to Forced "Medical" Interventions
The recognition of involuntary "medical" intervention as persecution also
correlates with the World War II background to the Convention. Involuntary
"medical" intervention constituted a method of persecution for many of the
specific groups targeted and hunted by Hitler's forces.55 Lesbian and gay
persons were not exempt from these general "medical" programs.56 Rather,
they faced the added risk of suffering involuntary "medical" procedures
designed to alter their sexuality:
In the fall of 1944... Dr Vaernet... appeared in the Buchenwald
concentration camp. With permission by Himmler ... Vaernet started
a series of experiments aimed at the elimination of homosexuality. The
implantation of synthetic hormones into the right lower abdomen was
meant to lead to a sex drive reversal. Of the total of 15 test subjects
(including two previously castrated males) ... two died, undoubtedly
as a result of the operation .... The others died a few weeks later as
a result of general weakness.
57
The connection between these past events and the present is striking.
According to one recent historical study, "The verbal denigration of
homosexuals, their stigmatization, imprisonment, and finally, forced 'cures' for
their alleged medical condition-in all these respects the Nazis merely
54. China's Iron Grip on 'Evil' Gays, THE OBSERVER (London), Nov. 27, 1994, at 23.
55. "Medical" projects included: a "skeleton collection" of Jewish persons killed for their bones, 1
TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NUREMBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL
LAW No. 10, at 738-59 (1949) [hereinafter TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS]; tuberculosis quarantines of Polish
nationals, I i., at 759-94; involuntary euthanasia of retarded children, I id, at 796-97; and mass
sterilization of "gypsy" communities, I id. at 718-19.
56. On the contrary, one report indicates that the number of "homosexuals" used in these "medical"
undertakings was "disproportionately large." See RICHARD PLANT, THE PINK TRIANGLE: THE NAZI WAR
AGAINST HOMOSEXUALS 175 (1986).
57. EUGEN KOGON, DER SS-STAAT 264 (1946), translated in Haeberle, supra note 49, at 377-78. Dr.
Vaernet's sexual orientation experiments were fully within the purview of the Convention's framers, as they
constituted primary material for a critical case before the International Military Tribunal. See 2 TRIALS OF
WAR CRIMINALS, supra note 55, at 251-52. Justice Jackson's "prosecution contend[ed] that the evidence
show[ed] Poppendick's criminal responsibility in connection with a series of experiments conducted at
Buchenwald by Dr. Vamet [sic] ... who claimed to have discovered a method of curing homosexuality
by transplantation of an artificial gland." 2 id. at 251. Thus Vaemet's actions in the fall of 1944 were
contained within the Convention's expansive concern for those events "occurring in Europe lore I
January 1951."
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continued and intensified what had long been general practice and what, in
various forms, still continues in many societies, including our own."5' A close
comparative fit, not a loose similarity, characterizes the relationship between
these Nazi practices and contemporary forms of involuntary medical treatment.
The Nazis adopted the very policies from which present-day refugees are
trying to escape: invasive "medical" procedures designed to permanently alter
sexual orientation. Compare the 1944 concentration camp "experiments" with
China's policy of "confin[ing] homosexuals for indefinite periods of time in
'reeducation' camps, as well as [seeking] to 'cure' them with electroshock and
herbs that induce vomiting to discourage erotic thoughts." 59
If a reaction to Nazi practices helped produce the Refugee Convention's
conception of "persecution," then the Chinese government's reproduction of
these practices should trigger the Convention's safeguards. It is nearly
axiomatic that the Nazi atrocities indelibly shaped the meaning of
"persecution." The Nazi policies were also the nominal antecedent of the
Convention's reference to protection from "events occurring in Europe before
January 1, 1951. "'6O If these events are replicated in a different place and time,
the persecuted individuals require a corresponding replication of asylum
protection. To conclude otherwise would be to turn the Convention as extended
through the 1967 Protocol into a dead letter.
A return to In re Pitcherskaia61 illustrates this argument. The 1967
Protocol states that "equal status should be enjoyed by all refugees covered by
the definition in the Convention irrespective of the dateline. 62 Pitcherskaia
faced involuntary confinement and the use of pharmaceuticals to deaden her
same-sex sexuality.63 In Nazi Germany, subjects of Dr. Vaernet's project also
faced the neutralization of their same-sex sexuality through invasive "medical"
procedures. The relevant distinctions between the experience of Pitcherskaia
and her German counterparts lie only in geography and time. Thus, the
immigration judge's denial of asylum to Pitcherskaia in essence discriminated
against her claim for the very reasons that are proscribed by the 1967 Protocol.
The following discussion of the Nuremberg Code supports this contention
through an examination of an alternative legal framework.
B. Nuremberg Code Provisions: Involuntary "Medical" Treatment
At the conclusion of World War I1, the United Nations War Crimes
Commission organized the Nuremberg Tribunal of Major War Criminals in its
58. Haeberle, supra note 49, at 378.
59. Wong, supra note 3, at 19.
60. Convention, supra note 18, art. 1(B)(1)a.
61. In re Pitcherskaia, No. A-72143932 (Immigration Judge June 13, 1994).
62. Protocol, supra note 20, pmbl.
63. In re Pitcherskaia, slip op. at 12-13.
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efforts to investigate, record, and adjudicate Nazi human rights violations. The
Charter and the Judgment of the International Military Tribunal (IMvT),
collectively entitled the Nuremberg Code (the Code), now carry the weight of
international law.64 It is the argument of this Note that within these pages of
legal text are the human rights principles that should govern involuntary
"medical" interventions on lesbian and gay persons.
1. The Unique Weight of Nuremberg in Asylum Law
The Nuremberg Code carries special consequence for asylum law's first
prong because of its historic association with the linguistic development of
persecution.65 The IMT helped define the contours of "persecution" in
determining the guilt of persons charged with "persecutions on political, racial
or religious grounds. 66 This wording closely mirrors the Convention's
definition of "refugee" as a person with a "well-founded fear of being
persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, [or] membership in a
particular social group or political opinion." 67 In this respect, the Nuremberg
Code possesses an immediate connection to the literal persecution covered
under the Convention. The Tribunal's coverage of these atrocities also inspired
the U.N. to codify them as fundamental human rights violations through
international treaties.68 Accordingly, the Nuremberg Code represents a critical
reference point for understanding postwar human rights standards and for
interpreting the meaning of "persecution."
Two additional considerations enable the Nuremberg Code to function as
a potentially decisive factor in asylum cases. First, as international law, the
Code arguably provides binding, rather than merely guiding, legal principles
64. On December 11, 1946, the U.N. General Assembly unanimously approved both the Charter and
the Judgment of the Nuremberg Tribunal as binding international law. See Affirmation of the Principles of
International Law Recognized by the Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal, 1946-1947 U.N.Y.B. 254, U.N.
Sales No. 1947.1.18; see also Siderman de Blake v. Argentina, 965 F2d 699, 715 (9th Cir. 1992)
("Whereas customary international law derives solely from the consent of states, the fundamental and
universal norms constitutingjus cogens transcend such consent, as exemplified by the theories underlying
the judgments of the Nuremberg tribunals following World War II.").
65. Certain asylum cases have acknowledged the Nuremberg Code's guidance in determining the
meaning of persecution. In Kulle v. INS, the Seventh Circuit upheld the claimant's deportation, in part
because of his participation as an agent of Nazi persecution. See Kulle v. INS, 825 F.2d 1188, 1193 (7th
Cir. 1987). Kulle contended that the international standards established at Nuremberg held that mere
presence during acts of persecution did not constitute participation or assistance. Id. at 1192. Although the
Seventh Circuit rejected Kulle's formalistic application of the Nuremberg principles to the issue of
"participation," the court acknowledged the Code's legitimate incorporation into judicial determinations of
"persecution." The court stated: "The legal principles established at Nuremberg have contributed much to
certain spheres of law and to the definition of 'persecution."' l at 1193; see also In re Laipenieks, 18 I.
& N. Dec. 433, 457 (1983) (relying on Nuremberg opinions).
66. 2 TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS, supra note 55, at 173.
67. Convention, supra note 18, ch. 1, art. I(A)2.
68. WILLIAM R. BOSCH, JUDGMENT ON NUREMBERG 231-32 (1970) (describing U.N. procedures for
drafting codes and conventions in alignment with principles set forth by Nuremberg Tribunal).
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for asylum cases. 69 A U.S. district court recently endorsed a far-reaching
scope for the Code: "The Nuremberg Code is part of the law of humanity. It
may be applied in both civil and criminal cases by the federal courts in the
United States. 70 Second, the U.S. military secured authority for conducting
the Nuremberg trials, conferring a particular burden of adherence on U.S.
courts.71 The Code thus provides strong weight for anchoring an asylum
claim. The following subsection employs the Code's treatment of "medical"
forms of persecution to support sexual orientation applications.
2. The Nuremberg Code's Prohibition of Involuntary
"Medical" Interventions
Opening on December 9, 1946, the very first trials held by the IMT at
Nuremberg concerned the "medical" practices of the Nazi regime. The
Tribunal's final opinion classified the commission of experimental "medical"
practices on unwilling subjects both as war crimes and as crimes against
humanity.72 The latter category is of greater importance for our purposes,
because it grounds the unacceptability of involuntary medical techniques in
non-war contexts. The count of "crime against humanity" carries additional
relevance since the IMT included within its definition, "persecutions on
political, racial or religious grounds."'73 Accordingly, the IMT's final
69. The Nuremberg Code's status as international law requires mention. But, for the purposes here,
it would be sufficient if the Code merely carried the persuasive value assigned to internationally recognized
human rights standards. This Note does not argue for the strong position of incorporating binding
international law and the concomitant creation of judicially enforceable rights. Rather, the consideration
of internationally recognized human rights norms merely functions as a persuasive guidepost for
adjudicatory determinations of persecution. This Note correspondingly diverges from scholarship that argues
for international law's binding effects in domestic courts. See, e.g., Richard B. Lillich, Invoking
International Human Rights Law in Domestic Courts, 54 U. CIN. L. REV. 367, 367 (1985). Nonetheless,
Nuremberg's status as international law signifies the centrality of its place in internationally recognized
human rights standards.
70. In re Cincinnati Radiation Litig., 874 F. Supp. 796, 821 (S.D. Ohio 1995).
71. Steven Fogelson, The Nuremberg Legacy: An Unfulfilled Promise, 63 S. CAL. L. REv. 833, 883
(1990) ("It is especially incumbent upon the United States, given its leading role in establishing and
participating in the Tribunal at Nuremberg, to incorporate this aspect of international law into its domestic
law."). This added burden of adherence has previously influenced judicial decisionmaking in the asylum
context. See, e.g., In re Doherty, 599 F. Supp. 270, 274 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) ("Moreover, it would not be
consistent with the policy of this nation as reflected by its participation in [the Nuremberg] trials, for an
American court to shield from extradition a person charged with such crimes."). In the trials of the Nazi
doctors, the United States commitment was even greater. See George J. Annas, The Nuremberg Code in
U.S. Courts: Ethics versus Expediency, in THE NAZI DOCTORS AND THE NUREMBERG CODE 201, 201
(George J. Annas & Michael A. Grodin eds., 1992) ("Mhe Doctors' Trial was conducted by U.S. judges
under the authority of the U.S. military, U.S. procedures were followed, and U.S. lawyers acted as the
prosecutors. Thus, if any country should feel itself bound by the legal precepts of the Nuremberg Code,
it is the United States."). Similarly, a recent federal court decision recognized a unique responsibility to
uphold Nuremberg's principles, due to the role played by the United States in the medical trials. See In re
Cincinnati Radiation Litig., 874 F Supp. at 819-20.
72. HISTORY OF THE UNITED NATIONS WAR CRIMES COMMISSION AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE
LAWS OF WAR 333-34 (1948).
73. See 2 TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS, supra note 55, at 173.
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Judgment announced as the first principle of the Nuremberg Code that the
voluntary consent of patients in experimental procedures is a fundamental,
legally cognizable human right.74
This aspect of the Nuremberg Code found unique recognition in a recent
Supreme Court case. In United States v. Stanley,75 a narrow Court majority
failed to recognize a cause of action based on the government's Vietnam-era
practice of LSD experimentation on unsuspecting army personnel. In a highly
critical dissent, Justice Brennan outlined with approval the values of
Nuremberg's first principle:
The medical trials at Nuremberg in 1947 deeply impressed upon the
world that experimentation with unknowing human subjects is morally
and legally unacceptable. The United States Military Tribunal
established the Nuremberg Code as a standard against which to judge
German scientists who experimented with human subjects. Its first
principle was:
"1. The voluntary consent of the human subject is
absolutely essential.
The United States military developed the Code, which applies to all
citizens-soldiers as well as civilians.76
An appreciation for these same principles also elicited the concerns of Justice
O'Connor, who separately reiterated Nuremberg's application in this case."
The Stanley dissents' evaluation of Nuremberg should govern cases
involving civilian subjects, especially in circumstances apart from military
interests. The situation of civilian subjects can be distinguished from the
majority's holding on a number of grounds. The Stanley Court's judgment
rested, in the first part of the decision, on a procedural error made during the
first stages of the case in the Eleventh Circuit.78 In the second part of its
judgment, the Court restricted its holding to military operations and injuries
resulting from activity "incident to service." '79 The majority also took special
care to distinguish the case's question of damage claims from alternative
74. 2 id. at 181-82.
75. 483 U.S. 669, 678 (1987).
76. Id. at 687 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citation omitted) (emphasis in
original).
77. Justice O'Connor reasoned: "IT]he standards that the Nuremberg Military Tribunals developed to
judge the behavior of the defendants stated that the 'voluntary consent of the human subject is absolutely
essential ... to satisfy moral, ethical and legal concepts."' 483 U.S. at 710 (O'Connor, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part) (quoting United States v. Brandt (The Medical Case), 2 TRIALS OF WAR
CRIMINALS, supra note 55, at 181 (1949)) (alteration in original).
78. The Eleventh Circuit erred by encouraging Stanley to re-enter a suit pursuant to the Federal Tort
Claims Act, a claim that had already been dismissed in lower court proceedings and was not the subject
of the interlocutory appeal before the court. Id. at 677-78.
79. Id. at 683-84.
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possibilities for constitutional redress.8" Stanley's holding thus confines itself
to a narrow range of issues. The majority's failure to apply the Nuremberg
Code should not seriously impinge on the distinctive legal claims open to
lesbian and gay asylum applicants.
These distinctions recently found expression in the widely publicized case
of In re Cincinnati Radiation Litigation.81 Here, the district court directly
applied the Stanley dissents' appreciation of the Nuremberg Code based on the
constitutional differentiation between civilian and military populations.82 The
district court held that the Code, as interpreted by Justice O'Connor's dissent
in Stanley, should apply to the U.S. government's human radiation
experiments, which deliberately exposed unsuspecting civilians to massive
doses of radiation. After ten pages of discussion of Nuremberg's first
principle of informed consent, the court quoted Justice O'Connor's Stanley
dissent: "'If this principle is violated, the very least society can do is to see
that the victims are compensated, as best they can be, by the perpetrators. I am
prepared to say that our Constitution's promise of due process of law
guarantees this much.' '' 84 Interestingly, the case drew some of its prominence
from testimony in congressional inquiries establishing that these actions had
occurred shortly after the promulgation, and in direct violation, of the
Nuremberg Code.85
3. Current Application of the Nuremberg Code to Involuntary
Sexual Orientation Interventions
The Nuremberg Code's first principle of informed consent has influenced
the outcome of several other judicial opinions.86 The holding of Kaimowitz
80. Id. at 684.
81. 874 F. Supp. 796 (S.D. Ohio 1995); see Ben L. Kaufman, Lawyers Compare Experiments in
Radiation to Nazi War Crimes, CINCINNATI ENQUIRER, Oct. 14, 1994, at B2; What a Year: Our Own List
of Top 10 Stories that Made Biggest News of 1994, CINCINNATI ENQUIRER, Jan. 1, 1995, at E2; ABC IVorld
News Tonight: Compensation Sought for Victims of Radiation Testing (ABC television broadcast, Apr. 11,
1994).
82. See 874 F. Supp. at 821-22.
83. "Justice O'Connor relied on the Nuremberg Code for the proposition that due process guarantees
the subjects of human experiments the right to voluntary and informed consent. Because Plaintiffs in this
case are not military personnel, the Court is convinced that Justice O'Connor's dissent in Stanley controls."
Id. at 821 n.23 (citing Whitlock v. Duke Univ., 637 F Supp. 1463, 1470 (M.D.N.C. 1986) and Kaimowitz
v. Michigan Dep't of Mental Health, No. 73-19434-AW (Mich. Cir. Ct. Wayne County, July 10, 1973)
(unpublished case), reprinted in ALEXANDER D. BROOKS, LAW, PSYCHIATRY AND THE MENTAL HEALTH
SYSTEM 902, 913 (1974) [hereinafter Kaimowitz]).
84. 874 F. Supp. at 822 (quoting U.S. v. Stanley, 483 U.S. 669,710 (1987) (O'Connor, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part)).
85. See generally Human Experimentation: An Overview on Cold War Era Programs: Hearing Before
House Government Operations Subcomr. on Legislation and National Security, 104th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1994) (statement of Frank C. Conahan, Assistant Comptroller General, National Security and International
Affairs Division, General Accounting Office), available in LEXIS, Legis Library, Allnws File. Conahan
documents the U.S. government's violation of the Nuremberg principles, as well as of the Helsinki Accord.
86. Other courts, in assessing challenged medical procedures, have employed the Code as guidance.
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v. Department of Mental Health,7 probably the most influential of these
cases, is also the most germane to contemporary sexual orientation asylum
issues. 88 The Kaimowitz three-judge panel relied heavily on the Code in
assessing the involuntary psychiatric treatment of persons deemed mentally
deviant due to their sexual practices. Specifically, the court invalidated the Iona
State hospital's use of psychosurgery without patients' informed consent,
resting its decision in significant part on the principles of Nuremberg. 9 The
hospital had planned to conduct surgical lobotomies pursuant to an
experimental study on "sexual psychopaths." 9 In its review, the court noted
that the circumstance of institutionalization demands an elevated level of
judicial scrutiny, since it is a setting that necessarily exerts a "special force in
undermining the capacity of the mental patient to make a competent decision
on this issue, even though he be intellectually competent to do so."9' This
statement, coupled with the Kaimowitz court's further recognition that
"[i]nvoluntarily confined mental patients live in an inherently coercive
institutional environment,"'  directly corresponds to the Code's stipulation
See, e.g., Whitlock v. Duke Univ., 637 F. Supp. 1463, 1470 (M.D.N.C. 1986) ("[Ihe Court is not left
without persuasive guidance on an appropriate standard of care in such context. The United States Military
Tribunal at Nuremberg adopted the Nuremberg Code as a proper statement of the law of informed consent
in connection with the trials of German Scientists for human experimentation after World War 1.");
Kaimowitz, supra note 83, at 913-914; Pierce v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 417 A.2d 505, 516 (NJ.
1980) (Pashman, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
87. Kaimowitz, supra note 83.
88. Kaimowitz spawned much discussion and helped shape the jurisprudence of informed consent in
psychiatric treatment. For example, shortly thereafter an article from a legal symposium on psychosurgery
noted: "Kaimowitz is probably the most important opinion yet published regarding the law's attempt to cope
with man's recently augmented power to control behavior." John R. Mason, Kaimowitz v. Department of
Mental Health: A Right to be Free from Experimental Psychosurgery?, 54 B.U. L. REv. 301, 303 (1974).
Kaimowitz's continuing relevance is demonstrated by the Cincinnati Radiation Litigation court's use of it
to distinguish Stanley. See In re Cincinnati Radiation Litig., 874 F Supp. 796, 821 n.23 (S.D. Ohio 1995).
Kaimowitz's legacy also includes Supreme Court recognition. Justice Brennan, in Parham v. J.R., refers
to Kaimowitz as historical evidence of the horrific medical procedures one might suffer once committed
to a mental institution: "Institutionalized mental patients must live in unnatural surroundings under the
continuous and detailed control of strangers. They are subject to intrusive treatment which, especially if
unwarrantcd, may violate their right to bodily integrity." 442 U.S. 584, 626 n.4 (1979) (Brennan, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing Kaimowitz, supra note 83). Although Justice Brennan did
not refer to the Kaimowitz court's treatment of the Nuremberg Code, his opinion's use of Kaimowitz
suggests its continuing vitality and influence.
89. See Kaimowitz, supra note 83, at 912. Here, the court reasoned that "[t]o be legally adequate, a
subject's informed consent must be competent, knowing and voluntary. In considering consent for
experimentation, the ten principles known as the Nuremberg code give guidance." Id. The court further
reasoned, "In the Nuremberg Judgment, the elements of what must guide us in decision are found." Id. at
913.
90. Notably, at the time of the Michigan hospital's planned study, "homosexuality" was categorized
as a "sexual deviation" mental illness by the American Psychiatric Association. See AMERICAN
PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 44 (2d ed. 1968).
Concurrently through the 1970s, the INS routinely denied admission to lesbian and gay immigrants under
statutory provisions excluding persons with a "sexual deviation" (which replaced their pre-1965 exclusion
under "psychopathic personality" provisions). Robert Poznanski, The Propriety of Denying Entry to
Homosexual Aliens: Examining the Public Health Service's Authority Over Medical Exclusions, 17 U.
MICH. J.L. REF. 331, 331 (1984).
91. Kaimowitz, supra note 83, at 913 (emphasis added).
92. Id. at 915.
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that voluntary consent requires that "the person involved should have legal
capacity to give consent [and] should be so situated so as to be able to exercise
free power of choice, without the intervention of any element of force, fraud,
deceit, duress, over-reaching, or other ulterior form of constraint or
coercion .... "'
A profound condition of constraint exists for many lesbian and gay persons
in institutional settings. Section III.B provides a more complete description of
certain of these facilities, 94 but, for now, it should suffice to recognize that
institutionalization in a psychiatric hospital, alone, greatly elevates a claim
under Nuremberg's first principle of informed consent. In this setting, the
capacity to refuse is drastically curtailed by the alignment of overpowering
institutional forces outside the inmate's control.
In response to this analysis, one argument against the use of the Code in
these sexual orientation persecution claims could spotlight the element of
experimentation. Under this objection, one might claim that a wide disjuncture
exists between the Nuremberg Code's specific concern with experimentation
studies and our concern with the use of psychiatric treatment as a curative. A
series of responses may be enlisted to counter this objection: (1) the "medical"
practices in question are invariably "experimental"; (2) even if the purpose of
these practices is not experimental, the techniques may be; (3) it is neither
ethically acceptable nor analytically valid to draw a distinction between
experimentation and cure in this context; (4) whether the practices constitute
experimentation is irrelevant because the final Nuremberg Judgment covers
medical issues beyond experimentation; (5) subsequent jurisprudence expands
the final Judgment beyond experimentation. The following discussion addresses
each of these points separately.
First, perhaps the best argument for designating these procedures as
experimentation is that the final Judgment itself so designates similar practices.
The pertinent case is that of SS Colonel Helmut Poppendick and his alleged
approval of Dr. Vaernet's "experiments." In this case, the IMT defined the
category of experimentation to encompass the actions "by Dr. Varnet [sic] ...
who claimed to have discovered a method of curing homosexuality by
transplantation of an artificial gland."95 No subsequent developments should
militate against this definition of experimentation. In fact, this option has been
ruled out by leading organizations in the psychiatric community. The
American Psychiatric Association (APA), in its 1993 Position Statement on
93. 2 TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS, supra note 55, at 181.
94. See infra text accompanying notes 160-61.
95. 2 TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS, supra note 55, at 251.
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Homosexuality, called for the cessation of all "medical" interventions rooted
in, or contributing to, the stigma of same-sex sexual orientation:
Whereas homosexuality per se implies no impairment in judgment,
stability, reliability, or general social or vocational capabilities, the
American Psychiatric Association (APA) calls on all international
health organizations, psychiatric organizations, and individual
psychiatrists in other countries .... to do all that is possible to
decrease the stigma related to homosexuality wherever and whenever
it may occur.
96
For the foreseeable future, the world community's established medical
authorities will not support the forced "medical" techniques conducted, for
example, by Singaporean,97 Russian,98 and Chinese99 authorities. These
countries have at times openly defied the minimal guidelines of the APA and
of the international medical community in general. Recently, Singapore's
government-controlled press unapologetically announced its latest "medical
treatment" for lesbian and gay citizens. According to the government's own
reports, this procedure tries "to change the patient by applying small electric
shocks while showing him or her pictures of homosexuals."' ° At best, these
modem-day replications of Dr. Vaernet's project are, as the IMT reasoned,
experimentation. °1'
Although the IMT failed to convict Poppendick on the charges relating to
Dr. Vaernet's study, Dr. Vaernet's surgeries are still covered by the Code. To
conclude otherwise requires ignoring the Tribunal's initial determination to
review these practices under the auspices of international law. The fact that a
particular murder charge fails to result in a conviction does not signify that
murder is not a criminal offense. Likewise, Poppendick's acquittal on this
particular criminal count does not signify that the original crime fails to
constitute a crime against humanity. Poppendick's case instead demonstrates
96. American Psychiatric Ass'n, Position Statement on Homosexuality, 150 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 686,
686 (1993).
97. See John Chua, A Political Reason for Singapore Torture, S.F. EXAINER, May 2, 1994, at A17.
98. For official Kremlin statements that reveal purposeful intransigence in the face of criticism from
the world psychiatric community, see Judicial Psychiatry on the Eve of Changes, OFFICIAL KREMLIN INT'L
NEWS BROADCAST, July 6, 1992, available in LEXIS, World Library, Sovnws File.
99. Chinese medical professionals have responded to visiting foreign lecturers with flat denials that
any gay persons exist in China. Vern L. Bullough and Fang Fu Ruan, Same-Sex Love in Contemporary
China, in THE THIRD PINK BOOK: A GLOBAL VIEW OF LESBIAN AND GAY LIBERATION AND OPPRESSION
46, 47-48 (Aart Hendriks et al. eds., 1993). Doctors in China celebrate the use of painful electroshock and
vile regurgitants to purge the same-sex thoughts of their mental inmates. Id. at 48.
100. Chua, supra note 97, at A17.
101. Even assuming that foreign state officials view their actions to be medically promising for the
lesbian and gay subjects of their work, the standards of Nuremberg would still apply. The Nuremberg
Code's mandate of informed consent governs both therapeutic research (intended to directly benefit or
provide "effective medical therapy" for the research subjects) and nontherapeutic research ("concerned with
the discovery of data through the research on the human subject"). Whitlock v. Duke Univ., 637 F. Supp.
1463, 1467 (M.D.N.C. 1986).
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the Code's admission of forced "medical" manipulation of sexual orientation
to the realm of experimentation under international law. In this regard, such
"medical" manipulation, the discussion of which forms an integral section of
the IMT's final Judgment, became a founding element of its first principle of
voluntary consent.
Furthermore, distinctions between asylum law and criminal law allow
sexual orientation applicants to rely on this aspect of the Code without facing
the burdens unique to Poppendick's prosecution. Principally, asylum applicants
are saddled with significantly less onerous burdens of proof. Poppendick's
hearing required the prosecution to establish guilt "beyond a reasonable
doubt."'02 Asylum cases, however, set one of the lowest burdens of proof
legally available: demonstration of a "reasonable possibility. 10 3 Although the
Tribunal found that there was inadequate evidence to establish Poppendick's
guilt, present-day asylum cases may more easily fill this evidentiary void. 4
Moreover, asylum proceedings are concerned with the applicant's "well-
founded fear of persecution," not the conviction of the persecutors. This legal
objective is made vividly apparent by the absence of named persecutors in all
parts of the proceeding. In this light, the JIvT's acquittal of Poppendick is
perhaps understandable, but a hypothetical denial of asylum to one of Dr.
Vaernet's gay subjects would be unthinkable.
In sum, the IMT considered forced "medical" interventions on gay male
prisoners both a matter for international law and a part of the body of material
informing its final Judgment. This alone signifies the imbeddedness of such
concerns within the edicts of the Nuremberg Code. Today, a potential victim
of such "medical" intervention should be able to employ the human rights
standards of Nuremberg as an index for demonstrating that asylum standards
of persecution have been met.
Second, even if the practice of sexual orientation intervention were not
experimentation, a foreign state's use of certain medical technology may
already constitute experimentation in U.S. courts. The experimental nature of
102. 2 TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS, supra note 55, at 252.
103. See INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 440 (1987) (holding that Protocol's "well-founded
fear of persecution" standard for asylum claims requires only demonstration of "reasonable possibility" of
persecution, which applicants might meet, for example, by demonstrating 10% possibility that they would
be subject to persecution abroad).
104. These evidentiary voids were peculiar to the prosecutor's presentation of Poppendick's case. For
example, the final Judgment reproduced the exhibit of a written communication between Poppendick and
a Dr. Ding concerning Dr. Vaemet's experiments. 2 TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS, supra note 55, at 252.
This document failed, in the Tribunal's view, to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Poppendick was
criminally involved in the hormonal experiments. 2 id. The Tribunal also criticized the lack of evidence
demonstrating the hormonal program's effects. 2 id. at 252. Evidence of the latter, however, has since been
uncovered. Eugen Kogon's study verified the completion and results of the surgery:
In Buchenwald a total of fifteen inmates were treated, of whom two died. Vaeret also tried his
hand with men who had been castrated. The matter became the butt of many jokes on the part
of the SS Medical Officers as well as the prisoners. No positive results were obtained.
EUGEN KOGON, THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF HELL 160 (Heinz Norden trans., 1949) (1946).
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the procedure itself may bridge the alleged gap between Nuremberg's
experimentation-specific laws and the sexual orientation "cures." Thus,
adjudicators and practitioners should consider the specific technique rather than
just the overall medical attempt to forcibly alter sexual orientation. The
administration of antipsychotic drugs, for instance, may classify the practice
as experimentation, because of the "exploratory" nature of the use of such
drugs for sexual orientation "therapy." The prevailing judicial opinion
regarding the medical value of antipsychotic drugs provides support for this
contention. In Riggins v. Nevada, a seven-member Supreme Court majority
rendered constitutionally impermissible the involuntary administration of
antipsychotic drugs to a pretrial detainee." 5 Writing for the Court, Justice
O'Connor recognized the uncertainties and the dangerous side effects
associated with these particular drugs. 6 In concurrence, Justice Kennedy
wrote specifically to express his own apprehensions regarding the state of
medical knowledge. 7 Their combined opinions exemplify the ready
availability of relevant case law to help guide asylum adjudicators in rendering
these medical decisions.'08 Furthermore, the adjudicator's task may be
simplified in the context of foreign states that inject lesbian and gay inmates
with pharmaceuticals "banned in the US because of their dubious benefits and
severe adverse side effects."' 9
Third, the alleged distinction between cure and experimentation is
untenable with regard to manipulation of sexual orientation. With the
background battle of acquiring protected status as a social group already won,
the notion of "curing" this same social group by medically removing their
affiliative link seems de facto persecutory. Moreover, the concept of "curing"
lesbian and gay sexual orientation is generally considered anathema by leading
105. 504 U.S. 127 (1992). Previously, in Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210 (1990), the Court had
considered the issue of involuntary administration of antipsychotic drugs to prison inmates. The Court
recognized a due process right to refuse the medication, which could be overridden only if a seriously
mentally ill prison inmate is a danger to self or others, and the treatment is in the inmate's medical interest.
Id. at 219-27. In Riggins, the Court narrowed Harper's holding to prison settings, in which constitutional
rights receive less protection. Riggins, 504 U.S. at 134-35.
106. For example, Justice O'Connor reproduced, at length, the description of unpredictable side effects
written by Justice Stevens in Harper. See Riggins, 504 U.S. at 134 (detailing intended effects of drugs in
altering chemical balance of brain and describing potential side effects, including irreversible neurological
disorders and cardiac failure). Justice O'Connor's recurrent employment of Justice Stevens's Harper
opinion is relevant to the next part's discussion of his use of the Helsinki Accord.
107. Justice Kennedy expressed severe doubt that the state could prove beneficial results from
administering involuntary doses of antipsychotic medicines, "given our present understanding of the
properties of these drugs." Id. at 139 (Kennedy, J., concurring). He also registered "substantial
reservations," based on his review of the medical literature, regarding the state's ability to avoid significant
mental impairment during the defendant's trial. Id. at 141.
108. This decision represents the controlling judicial appreciation for the medical utility of this
particular technique. In general, asylum adjudicators may turn to the accessible resource of prevailing
judicial opinion rather than searching through the medical literature.
109. HELSINKi WATCH, GLASNOST IN JEOPARDY 45 (1991).
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medical experts.1 The American Psychological Association's Executive
Director for Professional Practice recently explained that same-sex sexuality
"is neither mental illness nor moral depravity" and that "study after study [has
documented] the mental health of gay men and lesbians," suggesting that
efforts to "repair" their orientation are nothing more than "social prejudice
garbed in psychological accouterments."''
Furthermore, in these asylum cases, the trope of distinguishing "curative
purpose" from experimentation should be revealed for what it is-preliminary
testing and studying aimed at discovering the means for wide-scale
extermination of particular sexual orientations."' A country's history of
subordinating lesbian and gay persons helps unveil the pretextual character of
the "medical" rationales for these procedures. Consider the following
benevolent "health concerns" raised in defense of a doctor accused of
practicing forced sterilizations on certain population groups:
[His] life work.., as a physician was based on the principle of
helping the physically and mentally affected and to find cures for
restoring them as fully qualified members of human society.... He
also made this principle the finding [sic] principle of his work as chief
physician of the hospital at Hohenlychen.... [H]e was convinced that
the faculties of physically and mentally handicapped patients ought to
be improved by new methods of treatment and their efficiency thus
increased.'13
These words were voiced by a Dr. Gebhardt's legal counsel in defense of his
participation in the Nazi sterilization campaign. A central component of the
sterilization project featured the administration of a powerful pharmaceutical,
cladium seguinum, to those deemed "physically and mentally affected" without
their consent." 4 Gay men were among the subjects placed in this group. The
110. See Peter McColl, Homosexuality and Mental Health Services, BRIT. MED. J., Feb. 26, 1994, at
550, 550. ("Historically, medicine and psychiatry defined homosexuality as a disease or homosexuals as
disturbed. But rigorous research has failed to differentiate homosexual and heterosexual populations on the
basis of personality or psychopathology.").
111. American Psychological Association Official Bryant L. Welch Questions "Reparative Therapy"
for Homosexuality, PR NEWSWIRE, Jan. 26, 1990, available in LEXIS, News Library, Pmews File. For a
more thorough treatment of the broader medical ethics debate over whether protections accorded therapy
can be separated from those accorded experimentation and research, see Jay Katz, Human Experimentation
and Human Rights, 38 ST. LOUIS U. LJ. 7 (1993). According to Dr. Katz, "[p]hysician-investigators have
long maintained that clinical research and therapy, more often than not, are indistinguishable." Id. at 12.
Dr. Katz concludes that, notwithstanding a limited procedural distinction between the two, "the doctrine
of informed consent, as currently articulated, imposes similar disclosure and consent obligations for therapy
and research." Id. at 13. Therefore, even if the medical interventions concerning lesbian and gay refugees
can be distinguished as therapy rather than experimentation, the doctrine of informed consent still governs.
112. In a worrisome number of countries, the state actively hunts down and institutionalizes lesbian
and gay persons, subjecting them to forced psychiatric treatment. If any of these procedures hypothetically
proved successful, it is not unimaginable that a broader "cleansing" campaign would be launched.
113. 1 TRIALs OF WAR CRIMINALS, supra note 55, at 702-03.
114. 1 id. at 696-99, 706-07.
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sterilization campaign had independently targeted gay men as a mentally
deviant population requiring sexual neutralization. 15
Dr. Gebhardt's principle-based defense finds an analogue in present-day
attempts to justify forced "medical" intrusions into the hearts and minds of gay
and lesbian persons. The lack of informed consent and the background context
of past persecution should, as with the Nuremberg cases, effectively combine
to defeat this trope of curative purpose. In the case of In re Pitcherskaia, for
instance, the psychiatric fate of Russian lesbianism emerged out of a larger
history of state and societal repression. The insight of Masha Gessen, a refugee
from the former Soviet Union, provides a contextual account:
Neither laws nor public opinion change overnight, however.
Article 121 [male, same-sex sodomy statute] has not been repealed,
and though it is not included in the draft of the new penal code,
activists worry that the authorities will continue to enforce sexual-
assault laws selectively against homosexuals and that lesbians will
continue to be subjected to unwanted psychiatric treatment. A 1990
poll showed that a third of the population of the Soviet Union
believed that homosexuals should be exterminated, a third believed we
should be isolated from society, and only 10 percent believed we
should be left alone.1
16
Gessen's testimony fits into a vital and legally cognizable argument under
asylum law, which recognizes a country's past episodes of group-based
persecution as judicially relevant information." 7 This type of sociocultural
insight robs the curative pretext of its persuasiveness by revealing an
underlying motivation of "social cleansing" and extermination.
Again, even if the practice is not experimentation, there is a fourth
argument for applying the Code: The IMT's Judgment rendered legal
pronouncements on matters beyond mere experimentation. For example, the
IMT's proceedings and legal decisions encompassed the Third Reich's
involuntary euthanasia program, the skeleton collection project, and the scheme
to exterminate and quarantine certain Polish nationals." 8 Additionally, the
Nuremberg Code's first principle, stating "voluntary consent of the human
subject is absolutely essential,"" 9 contrasts with the other nine principles,
which clearly evince concern specifically for experimentation subjects. The
115. "A further decree of 1935 provided for the compulsory sterilisation (often in fact castration) of
homosexuals, along with epileptics, schizophrenics, and other 'degenerates."' David Fembach, Introduction
to HEINZ HEGER, THE MEN wrrH THE PINK TRIANGLE 7, 12 (1980).
116. Masha Gessen, We Have No Sex: Soviet Gays andAIDS in the Era of Glasnost, in COMING OUT:
AN ANTHOLOGY OF INTERNATIONAL GAY AND LESBIAN WRITINGS 57, 69 (Stephan Likosky ed., 1992).
117. The BIA stated: "Where the country at issue in an asylum case has a history of persecuting
people in circumstances similar to the asylum applicant's, careful consideration should be given to that fact
in assessing the applicant's claims." In re Mogharrabi, 19 1. & N. Dec. 3028 (BIA 1987) (emphasis added).
118. See supra note 55 discussing medicalized projects.
119. 2 TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS, supra note 55, at 181.
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generality of the first principle's language thus arguably invites its application
beyond the scope of experimentation. For instance, the Tribunal relied on the
principle of informed consent in its consideration of the Nazi euthanasia
program, a discrete issue clearly separate from the list of experimentation
studies. t20
Finally, the Nuremberg Code's first principle of informed consent has been
broadened beyond mere experimentation by subsequent jurisprudence. Justice
Stevens's dissenting opinion in Washington v. Harper relied on "the principle
stated by the Nuremberg Military Tribunals 'that the voluntary consent of the
human subject is absolutely essential .... to satisfy moral, ethical and legal
concepts.' '12'  This consideration anchored his position that unwarranted
antipsychotic medication is especially "degrading if it overrides a competent
person's choice to reject a specific form of medical treatment."'" Difficulties
arguably arise in giving too much weight to Justice Stevens's analysis because
it occurs in a dissent.'2 Notwithstanding that quandary, the Code still offers
the best available human rights standard for judging the permissibility of these
acts. The Nuremberg trials "infused international law with fundamental moral
principles in a manner not seen for more than a century and gave birth to the
modern international law of human rights."'24 As such, they reasonably exert
120. The relevance of informed, uncoerced consent with regard to nonexperimental medical practices
appears, for instance, in the specific judgment of Karl Brandt. Here, concerned with the euthanasia program,
the IMT emphasized the lack of necessary consent:
Persons actively concerned in the program were required to subscribe a written oath of secrecy
and were warned that violation of that oath would result in most serious personal consequences.
The consent of the relatives of the "incurables" was not even obtained .... Needless to say,
these persons did not voluntarily consent to become the subjects of this procedure.
2 TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS, supra note 55, at 197. Similarly, briefs submitted by the prosecution
described the medical warehousing of tubercular patients in-"a reservation similar to the reservation for
lepers." 1 id. at 762.
121. Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 237 n.2 (1990) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part). In this footnote, Justice Stevens redeploys Justice O'Connor's opinion from United
States v. Stanley, 483 U.S. 669, 710 (1987) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
122. Harper, 494 U.S. at 237 (1990) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
123. However, this aspect of Justice Stevens's dissent is arguably in agreement with the conclusions
of the majority. No dispute existed concerning whether inmate Harper possessed a "significant liberty
interest in avoiding the unwanted administration of antipsychotic drugs." Harper, 494 U.S. at 221. In fact,
Stevens quoted the majority to demonstrate his agreement on this issue. IL at 237 (Stevens, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part). The two sides, though, differed in their respective evaluations of the
Washington state prison's administrative protections of this right. The majority took special care to explain
that their disagreement with the dissent concerned this procedural, not substantive, question of due process.
IL at 228. Thus, Justice Stevens's application of the Code did not conflict with the Court's holding.
Moreover, Justice Stevens's conclusions were vindicated, in large part, by Justice O'Connor's opinion for
the Court in Riggins, 504 U.S. at 127. Extracts from Justice Stevens's Harper dissent form a veritable basis
of Riggins' seven-member majority opinion. See discussion supra notes 105-06. Even if one considers these
arguments unconvincing, Justice Stevens's opinion nonetheless adds legitimacy to international human
rights standards. Both the Harper and Riggins holdings recognize a fundamental liberty interest in the right
to refuse antipsychotic medication. Justice Stevens's employment of the Code, though in dissent, is in this
sense an elaboration of the argument's underlying rationale.
124. Fogelson, supra note 71, at 833; see also ROBERT K. WOETZEI, THE NUREMBERG TRIALS IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW (1962).
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a pervasive influence on both courts and litigants.125 Justice Stevens
recognized the instrumental value of applying the Code's framework in a
sphere unmistakably beyond its original reach. At the very least, his approach
is both encouraging and instructive. The ethical and legal framework outlined
by the IMT offers a conceptual tool for analyzing the involuntary "medical"
interventions faced by lesbian and gay refugees. Gauged by the Nuremberg
Code's standards for human rights, these practices substantively satisfy a legal
showing of persecution.
III. THE HELsnuI AccoRD
The Nuremberg Code emerged in response to the atrocities discovered by
the world community at the close of World War II. Similarly, subsequent
international human rights instruments have arisen in recognition of other
forms of widespread persecution. One set of these instruments, the 1975
Helsinki Accord,1 26  directly addresses new concerns regarding the
persecutory use of "medical" practices. As such, the Accord offers another
framework for articulating the asylum claims of many lesbian and gay
refugees.
A. The Grounding of Human Rights Provisions Against Medical Abuse
During the Cold War, contending nations heavily scrutinized each other's
internal conditions. Domestic human rights issues surfaced as one of the
principal sources of East-West debate. In a spirit of relative cooperation, thirty-
five countries agreed to codify international standards for human rights by
which all members should abide.127 This group, organized as the Conference
on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), recorded its human rights
principles as an integrated section of the resulting Helsinki Final Act. 128 The
1975 Helsinki Final Act possessed several unique features. It declined treaty
status,2 9 insisted on consensus voting for all issues, 130 and required a
125. Fogelson, supra note 71, at 903. Fogelson endeavors to influence courts and parties to incorporate
the Nuremberg Code explicitly in their decisionmaking. His discussion centers on the Code as judicially
enforceable, binding international law. Id. As such, his trouble with the Code's status as binding law is not
a concern for this Note's conclusion. See discussion supra note 69.
126. Final Act of the Conference on Security and Co-Operation in Europe, Aug. 1, 1975, 14 I.L.M.
1292 [hereinafter Final Act].
127. The nations included the United States, Canada, the Soviet Union, and all European countries
except Albania. Thomas Buergenthal, International Human Rights Law and the Helsinki Final Act:
Conclusions, in HUMAN RIGHTS, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE HELSINKI ACCORD 3, 3 (Thomas
Buergenthal ed., 1977).
128. Final Act, supra note 126. The Helsinki Accord tackled a host of other issues, including scientific
cooperation, security concerns, and commercial exchanges.
129. President Ford stated before signing the Accord: "I would emphasize that the document I will
sign is neither a treaty nor is it legally binding on any particular state." European Security Conference
Discussed by President Ford, 73 DEP'T ST. BULL. 204, 205 (1975). Nevertheless, the Helsinki Accord
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series of Follow-Up Meetings.131 The third CSCE Follow-Up Meeting, after
twenty-seven months of negotiation, culminated in 1989 in the Concluding
Document of the Vienna Meeting (VCD),132 which codified breakthrough
results in the area of human rights. 133 This achievement was due primarily
to Gorbachev's reversal of previous Soviet intransigence." Speaking a new
"common language of human rights," the CSCE agreed to specify certain
principles in unprecedented detail.' 35
A commitment to eliminating state-sanctioned abuse of psychiatric
practices emerged from this new climate of openness and cooperation. The
U.S. delegation had promised to advance this concern as a priority issue,
having learned of the Soviet and East European use of psychiatry as a tool of
repression.136 The delegation achieved marked success. The final document
contained a provision (I 23f) requiring nations to end abusive "medical"
practices as a mandate of fundamental human rights: "The participating States
will.., protect individuals from any psychiatric or other medical practices that
violate human rights and fundamental freedoms and take effective measures to
prevent and punish such practices."
137
The CSCE's decision to place the provision against abusive "medical"
practices on a short list of significant human rights violations indicates its
importance; the other five provisions on the list involved well-established,
long-venerated human rights concerns. 3 The elevation of "medical" human
operates as an important determinant of international human rights standards. See United States v.
Kakwirakeron, 730 . Supp. 1200, 1202 (N.D.N.Y. 1990) ("The Helsinki Accords, the objectives of which
have received continued support from the signatory states, would certainly be indicative of the status of
international law on self-determination of peoples and of the duty of nations to abide by their international
obligations."); see also Jochen A. Frowein, The Interrelationship between the Helsinki Final Act, the
International Covenants on Human Rights, and the European Convention on Human Rights, in HUMAN
RIGHTS, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE HELSINKI ACCORD, supra note 127, at 71 (discussing significance
of Final Act in forwarding other human rights instruments).
130. Final Recommendations of the Helsinki Consultations 69 (1973), reprinted in JOHN J.
MARESCA, To HELSINKI: THE CONFERENCE ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE 1973-1975, at
243 (2d ed. 1987).
131. Final Act, supra note 126, f[ 1324-25.
132. Meeting of the Conference on Security and Co-Operation in Europe: Concluding Document from
Vienna, 28 I.L.M. 527 (1989) [hereinafter VCD].
133. The first two Follow-Up Meetings, dealing with this dimension of the Final Act, had both failed
to produce a concluding document. Their incapacity was mostly due to the stringent requirement of
unanimity and the backdrop of Cold War hostilities. See Chris van Esterik & Hester Minnema, The
Conference That Came in From the Cold, in THE HUMAN DIMENSION OF THE HEISINKI PROCESS 1, 2 (Arie
Bloed & Pieter Van Dijk eds., 1991).
134. STEFAN LEHNE, THE VIENNA MEETING OF THE CONFERENCE ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION
IN EUROPE, 1986-1989, at 150-52 (1991).
135. Id. at 151-52.
136. Laurie Watson, U.S. to Raise Soviet Psychiatric Abuses at Human Rights Conference, UPI, May
6, 1985, available in LEXIS, News Library, UPI File.
137. VCD, supra note 132, at 535 23f.
138. See id. 23. "Medical" human rights violations share company with the following: arbitrary
arrest, detention, or exile, id. I 23a; inherent dignity of individuals in incarceration or detention, id. I 23b;
observation of the Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners and the Code of Conduct for Law
Enforcement Officials, id. 23c; torture and other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment
id. I 23d; consideration of acceding to the Convention against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or
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rights violations to unanimous, official recognition was, in the view of one
analyst of the Vienna Conference, "[m]ost significant, in light of the
widespread abuses in this area.'
139
B. Current Applications: Sexual Orientation Persecution
The plain language of the VCD's Provision 23f alone should compel
asylum adjudicators to consider "medical" interventions that are designed to
forcibly alter sexual orientation as a transgression of international human rights
standards. Nevertheless, a well-documented history of congressional and
executive deliberation lends itself to resolving any interpretative ambiguities
if necessary. Both Congress and the executive branch have condemned various
uses of forced "medical" intervention. For instance, federal legislation
specifically invoked the Helsinki Accord in the wake of Romania's psychiatric
institutionalization and forced drugging of Christians. 40 In addition, the U.S.
delegation at the Vienna Meeting formally addressed "the commitment of sane
persons to [psychiatric] institutions.' 14' A congressional human rights
subcommittee similarly denounced "psychiatric incarceration to punish free
expression" as a violation of Helsinki principles. The Soviet Union's
"pattern of systematic misdiagnosis and major shortcomings in pharmacology"
also met with extreme disapproval when reviewed by the U.S. Commission on
Security and Cooperation in Europe, the interbranch body responsible for
monitoring Helsinki compliance.' 4 Surely the identical practices perpetrated
against lesbian and gay persons violate the Helsinki Accord.' 44
Degrading Treatment or Punishment, id. I 23e.
139. LEHNE, supra note 134, at 161.
140. The Senate adopted Symms Amendment No. 945, which raised the issue of "[r]elatives of
Christian believers [who] are often compelled to sign statements that could subject their loved ones, solely
because of their religious belief-to treatment and detention in psychiatric hospitals." 131 CONG. REC.
30,241-42 (1985). This allegation, number nine on the list of grievances, contributed to the amendment's
final statement that "[t]hese actions are particularly objectionable because they are in blatant violation of
the Helsinki Accords." Il at 30,241.
141. Richard Schifter, U.S. and Soviet Quality of Life Compared, Address by the Head of U.S.
Delegation to Helsinki Accord, Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (May 22, 1985), in
VOJTECH MASTNY, HELSINKI, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND EUROPEAN SECURrY 289, 291 (1986).
142. See Democratic Reforms and Human Rights in Eastern Europe, Hearings of the Human Rights
and International Organizations Subcomm. of the House Foreign Affairs Comm., Federal News Service,
Oct. 11, 1989, available in LEXIS, Legis Library, Fednew File (statement by Steny Hoyer, Chair)
[hereinafter Democratic Reforms].
143. Steny H. Hoyer, Psychiatric Abuses Persist in Russia, WASH. POST, Aug. 22, 1989, at A19. After
the Vienna Follow-Up concluded, the Soviet Union permitted an official delegation of U.S. specialists to
examine psychiatric facilities and patients. The U.S. experts were permitted access to 24 patients who had
been hospitalized for schizophrenia or other psychological disorders. Id. "Yet when Soviet psychiatrists
examined these 24 patients together with the U.S. delegation, using standard diagnostic criteria, they
diagnosed such disorders in only nine cases.... Their report also observed that antipsychotic medicines
have been used for punitive purposes on patients who exhibit no signs of psychoses." Id. Representative
Hoyer was co-chair of the U.S. Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe. Id.
144. For asylum purposes, attempting to forge a distinction between lesbian and gay persons and these
other groups is not legally viable, given the equally protected status accorded sexual orientation.
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One might object to this assessment, however, by claiming a distinction
between forced "medical" intervention as political torture and forced medical
intervention as therapy. Under this view, lesbian and gay persons are forcibly
subjected to "medical" practices due to a curative motivation,.not a punitive
one. A series of rejoinders should eliminate this objection. First, the objection
is premised on the shaky assumption that intentions matter, while asylum case
law recognizes that oppression is no less severe if perpetrated by the well-
intentioned. 45 Similarly, VCD Provision 23f is not concerned with state
intentions behind psychiatric abuse. 14 6 In fact, a government's unintentional
neglect of persistent psychiatric abuse may constitute a violation.147 Thus, a
persecutor's unintentional neglect, curative purpose, or other supposedly
innocent motivations that might nevertheless be responsible for a deprivation
of human rights do not reduce an asylum applicant's eligibility.
Second, the Helsinki principles also govern circumstances in which
individuals are arguably medically ill. For example, Helsinki Watch reported
on the Russian "medico-labor prophylactic colonies" in which suspected
chronic alcoholics and drug addicts are forced to undergo severe psychiatric
treatment: "Initially, inmates are subject to an aversion therapy reminiscent of
'A Clockwork Orange,' that consists of seating them around a large trough,
pouring them some of their favorite drink laced with a chemical to induce
vomiting, and letting them drink and vomit into the trough."'48 These
"medical" tactics closely resemble, in almost textbook form, certain of the
sexual orientation procedures we have already discussed. 149 Thus, the
Helsinki principles render certain "medical" practices impermissible without
having to resolve concerns about the legitimacy of classifying lesbian and gay
persons as mentally ill.
Other provisions of the Helsinki Accord further inform this analysis. The
Final Act itself suggests that the application of its principles should
145. Motivation does matter in one aspect: An applicant must provide evidence that the persecutor was
motivated on account of the applicant's status in one of the five enumerated groups (political opinion, social
group, religion, nationality, or race). See INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 482 (1992). But asylum law
does not require that the persecutor be motivated by malice. See Fisher v. INS, 37 F.3d 1371, 1383 (9th
Cir. 1994) (authorities' enforcing moral codes "in spite of knowledge of" dissenting beliefs); Fatin v. INS,
12 F.3d 1233 (3d Cir. 1993) (requiring conformance to laws that are fundamentally abhorrent to one's
deeply-held religious beliefs); In re Sanchez & Escobar, 19 I. & N. 276 (BIA 1985) (interim decision)
("One of the significant aspects of this construction of 'persecution' was the concept that the harm or
suffering had to occur as the result of a belief or characteristic an oppressor sought to overcome or punish
in an individual." (emphasis added)). Interestingly, psychiatric aversion therapy may uniquely satisfy a
combination of seeking both to "overcome and punish" due to its aversive penalty-motivation.
146. See VCD, supra note 132, 23f.
147. The provision's commitment for states to "take effective measures to prevent and punish such
practices" reflects the signatories' understanding that the human rights violations of "medical" abuse may
exist in absence of affirmative state action. Id.
148. HELSINKI WATCH, PRISON CONDSIONS IN THE SOVIET UNION: A REPORT OF FACILrrlES IN
RusSIA AND AZERBAIDZHAN 56 (1991).
149. See supra text accompanying note 100.
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coincide--"each of them being interpreted taking into account the others."15
Thus, provisions of the Final Act reaffirm Provision 23f's direct prohibition of
involuntary "medical" procedures. For example, the Final Act's Point VII
requires the protection of freedoms of conscience and thought.151 Certain
psychiatric procedures risk eviscerating these freedoms at their core. The
Moscow Group to Promote Observance of Helsinki included in its mission the
reporting of "special manifestations of inhumanity, for example... forcible
psychiatric treatment with the purpose of changing thoughts, conscience,
religion, or beliefs.' 52 Similarly, in his Harper dissent, Justice Stevens
incorporated Helsinki standards in his reasoning that forcible administration of
antipsychotic drugs risks illegitimate government interference. 53 He quoted
from congressional testimony regarding the Soviet Union's use of psychiatric
interventions: "'It is obligatory that Helsinki signatory states not manipulate
the minds of their citizens; that they not step between a man and his
conscience or his God; and that they not prevent his thoughts from finding
expression through peaceful action."'154 Justice Stevens's legal analysis
implies judicial willingness to incorporate international human rights standards
and supplies an example to be followed by other courts.
In the case of sexual orientation interventions, the self-proclaimed goals
of the attending physicians manifestly conflict with Helsinki's strong
protections of conscience and thought. Regardless of punitive or therapeutic
motive, the purpose of involuntary sexual orientation procedures is, by
definition, the forced alteration of cognition. This attempted mental reordering
of lesbian and gay persons intrudes on their consciences and their rights of
expression. 55 The element of involuntariness constitutes the harm, and the
use of certain procedures amplifies the damage. 56 Indeed, this domineering
150. Final Act, supra note 126, 1296.
151. See id. 1295. "The participating States will respect human rights and fundamental freedoms,
including the freedom of thought, conscience, religion or belief, for all without distinction as to race, sex,
language or religion." ld.
152. Iurii Orlov et al., On the Formation of the Public Group to Promote the Observance of the
Helsinki Agreements in the USSR, May 12, 1976, in REPORTS OF THE HELSINI ACCORD MoNrroRs IN THE
SoviEr UNION 3 (1977), reprinted in MASTNY, supra note 141, at 103.
153. See Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 238 (1990) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
154. Id. at 238 n.3 (quoting Hearings on Abuse of Psychiatry in the Soviet Union Before the Subcoma.
on Human Rights and International Organizations of the House Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 98th Cong.,
1st Sess. 106 (1983) (remarks by Max Kampelman, Chair of the U.S. Delegation, Plenary Session of
Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe)).
155. For a more extensive development of this argument, see Bruce J. Winick, The Right to Refise
Mental Health Treatment: A First Amendment Perspective, 44 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1 (1989).
156. For example, the freedoms of thought, conscience, and belief are literally vanquished by the
administration of psychotropic drugs. The medications chemically cripple the subject's ability to formulate
independent thoughts. Dr. Anatoly Koryagin, who spent six years in a Soviet prison after accusing the
government of putting dissidents in mental hospitals, described the purpose and effects of administering
these drugs:
I documented of course what they were doing to these people .... Namely, the fact that they
were giving them [a] neuroleptic drugf ... [which] essentially affects the central nervous
1995]
The Yale Law Journal [Vol. 105: 255
mental invasion distinguishes psychiatric confinement as a unique form of
persecution, perhaps even more severe than circumstances of criminal
imprisonment." 7
The Helsinki principles also require the promotion of individuals' ability
to engage in social, civil, and political discourse in accord with the "dignity
of the human person." '158 The forced psychiatric incarceration of lesbian and
gay persons effectively defies this edict, as institutionalization segregates a
person from her community. Asylum adjudicators should recognize this
dynamic as uniquely persecutory for social group claimants." 9 Additionally,
adjudicators should avoid being deceived by the benevolent guise of mental
health. A closer review of political and cultural contexts should assist their
understanding. For example, in some foreign states, mental health institutions
are often run by the ministry of interior, which is the military and law
enforcement arm of the state. 6 The prison-like facilities of these hospitals,
such as those in Cuba, may bear little resemblance to their American
counterparts. 61 Furthermore, cultural factors surrounding the discourse of
mental health may generate levels of social stigma unimagined by an
uninformed American perspective. 62 Indeed, for a lesbian or gay person
system, affects your ability to move and it also can create some very bad side effects if it goes
and is given uncorrected.... One purpose was to crush their will, remove power. And then also
to create a very, very strange and difficult feeling ....
The MacNeil/Lehrer NewsHour (PBS television broadcast, June 24, 1987).
157. The Supreme Court noted an elevated due process concern in the transfer of a prison inmate to
a psychiatric institution due to unique personal deprivations not deserved by criminal conviction. See Vitek
v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480 (1980). In the Soviet Union, many have had the ability to compare forced
imprisonment with psychiatric institutionalization and have found the latter much more abhorrent. See
ALEXANDER PODRABINEK, PUNITIVE MEDICINE 37 (1980); Richard J. Bonnie, In the West, The Verdict on
Soviet Psychiatry Is Still Out, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 8, 1989, at ES.
158. "The participating States ... will promote and encourage the effective exercise of civil, political,
social, cultural and other rights and freedoms all of which derive from the inherent dignity of the human
person and are essential for his free and full development." Final Act, supra note 126, 1295.
159. Asylum law recognizes, rather generically, that "confinement" alone can generate a condition of
persecution. See Fisher v. INS, 37 F.3d 1371, 1380 (9th Cir. 1994).
160. After expulsion from the World Psychiatric Association, and in order to seek reentry in the late
1980s, the Soviet Union transferred control of several of its mental hospitals from the Interior Ministry to
the Ministry of Health. Nevertheless, doctors continued to hold military rank, and most of the staff
members were still Interior Ministry employees. Brooke A. Masters, Soviets Still Hospitalized for Political
Views, Group Says, WASH. POST, July 13, 1989, at All; Soviets Still Abuse Foes, Group Says, CHI. TRIB.,
Apr. 18, 1990, at 22 [hereinafter Soviets Still Abuse Foes]. In 1990, the Soviet Interior Ministry still
maintained control over 1,000 psychiatric hospitals throughout the country. Id. at 22. Certain of these
conditions persist in post-Soviet Russia. See, e.g., Judicial Psychiatry, supra note 98. In Cuba as well, the
Interior Ministry helps manage psychiatric hospitals. See, e.g., Vladimir Orlov, Punitive Psychiatry in
Socialist Cuba, Moscow NEWS, Mar. 29, 1992, available in LEXIS, World Library, Mosnws File.
161. See, e.g., Orlov, supra note 160.
162. In certain echelons of modem American life, "seeing an analyst" may be routine or even "sexy,"
but in Russia, for example, psychiatry is clouded by the past of Soviet repression. See Genine Babakian,
Russians Confused by Therapy, MosCOW TIMES, July 23, 1994, at 510 ("'After all, it wasn't long ago that
the only access to psychiatric care was through the police and a straightjacket' .... 'People still associate
psychiatry with political repression."' (quoting Dr. Nikolai Naritsyn)); Lidove Noviny, Psychiatry in Chaos,
THE GUARDIAN (London), Feb. 2, 1993, at 16 ("Those who went through psychiatric treatment were
marked people .... 'If someone visits a psychiatrist in Europe or America, it is a matter of social prestige.
In Russia it is totally unacceptable."' (quoting Dr. Modest Kabanov)).
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already burdened with the social ostracism that pervades particularly
heterosexist cultures, the official label of mental insanity brands them for
life.1 63 The double burden of public exposure of their sexual orientation and
the cultural meaning attached to forced psychiatric hospitalization essentially
relegates them to a long and painful social death."6 Such state-generated
public opprobrium fundamentally interferes with the "inherent dignity of the
human person" as protected by the Helsinki Accord 6
C. Current Applications: Russian Punitive Medicine
The Helsinki Accord provides a conceptual tool for unmasking the trope
of medical beneficence by challenging it on a more fundamental level.
Previously, the Soviet Union's official use of medicalization to disguise its de
facto criminalization of political and social dissidence posed an evaluative
difficulty for its critics. The Helsinki Accord, however, offered them a
framework for articulating the unacceptability of such practices . 66 VCD
Provision 23f defined medicine as a potential mechanism for persecutory goals,
rather than as a presumptive or unmitigated good. This maneuver robbed the
medicalization trope of much of its persuasive value. The remaining inquiry
looked to the socio-political context behind the medical practices to determine
whether or not a gross violation of human rights was in operation. The
Helsinki Accord, as a directive for international standards of human rights,
thus offers effective assistance for many lesbian and gay asylum applicants.
In Pitcherskaia's case, for example, the immigration judge framed his
opinion in terms of Russian psychiatry both as an enactment of medical
163. Notably, a unanimous Supreme Court based its holding, in part, on recognition of the
"indisputable" and "significant impact" of social stigma generated by involuntary psychiatric
institutionalization in America. See Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 425-26 (1979) (holding that civil
proceedings to commit individual involuntarily to state mental hospital require "clear and convincing"
standard of proof).
164. In many countries, these social effects may be quite severe. Dr. Simon Gluzman describes the
veritable social death of involuntary psychiatric inmates in Russia after their release:
There are the living and the dead, the living and the dead eyewitnesses. The most horrible
thing is the victims still walking on this earth. They are deprived of their jobs, their families
have left them. Many can't take part in life. They've been broken, and there's nobody to help
them.
Nightline: The Soviet Psychiatric System (ABC television broadcast, Sept. 25, 1991) [hereinafter Nightline].
165. Although U.S. constitutional guarantees are not extended to asylum applicants, Supreme Court
cases addressing involuntary institutionalization may still be instructive. The Court has used some of its
strongest language with regard to this issue: "We have recognized that for the ordinary citizen, commitment
to a mental hospital produces 'a massive curtailment of liberty."' Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 491 (1980)
(quoting Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504, 509 (1972)); see also Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 80
(1992) (quoting Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354, 361 (1983)).
166. The former chair of the U.S. Helsinki Commission described the pragmatic utility of the Helsinki
Accord in terms of its ability to frame standards for abuse of state power. "[I]n Romania, there are persons
of great courage and integrity who are continuing, even in the face of severe repression, to raise issues of
human rights. And when they do so, they point to the Helsinki process as their justification for doing so.
So, it gives them a philosophical and political framework within which to act." Democratic Reforms, supra
note 142.
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beneficence and as a medicalized profession distinct from the military
establishment.67 A relevant consideration is how this Note's analytic strategy
might have advanced Pitcherskaia's claim. If Pitcherskaia's application had
been pursued along a Helsinki human rights approach and informed by the
knowledge of historic Russian psychiatric abuse, hopefully the judicial
outcome would have been different. At the very least, the judge's discursive
ability to reach his somewhat facile conclusions would have been curtailed.
The following discussion demonstrates the usefulness of the Helsinki Accord
for many lesbian and gay asylum applicants, in general, by focusing on
Russian medical practices as a model.
168
During the last decade, the Helsinki Accord was repeatedly invoked to
demonstrate that psychiatric incarceration of political dissidents was truly a
state effort to neutralize objectionable ways of thinking and was thus no
different from criminal imprisonment or internment in reeducation camps. The
Helsinki Accord correspondingly demonstrates the illegitimacy of this form of
neutralization of sexual identity. In the case of post-Soviet Russia, the
continued incarceration of lesbian and gay persons should be seen as a product
of the exact same deployment of state power.
169
Russia's ongoing use of psychiatry as a disciplinary and punitive technique
is rooted in a horrific past. One of the most revealing examinations of Soviet
psychiatry appears in Alexander Podrabinek's book Punitive Medicine.170 The
book's title expresses his conclusion that Soviet psychiatry was a breed apart
from the traditions of benevolent medicine. Punitive medicine entailed the
production of institutional power to quash those actions that the state
considered to be either potentially threatening forms of nonconformity or
abhorrent forms of unconventionality.''
167. Remarkably, the immigration judge spoke in terms of psychiatrists' possible concern for
"treatment" and for the otherwise fragile mental health of lesbian women. See In re Pitcherskaia, No.
A-72143932, slip op. at 12-13 (Immigration Judge June 13, 1994). His failure to recognize Russian medical
professionals and their concerns as a subsection of the Russian military perhaps reveals his limited
knowledge of the political and institutional setting. Id. at 12, 24.
168. I have selected the Russian experience as a centerpiece for this discussion because it is one of
the most well-documented histories of psychiatric abuse and because of its relevance to In re Pitcherskaia.
169. In a recent article, a now freed political dissident recounted the use of mental hospitals as a
suppressive method of psychiatric neutralization: "'They never believed that I was mentally ill. They told
me that I was being held to keep me from resuming my activities."' Lori Cydilo, The Insanity of Russian
Psychiatry, WORLD PRESS REV., Aug. 1993, at 44, 44. The reporter covering this story noted that "[u]nder
the communists, hundreds, perhaps thousands, of political dissidents were forced to have 'treatment' in
psychiatric hospitals as a way to silence them. They were not the only ones. Many whose cases were never
publicized suffered the same fate." Id. These other cases included the sexual dissidents who still languish
in their cells. See MASHA GESSEN, INTERNATIONAL GAY & LESBIAN HUMAN RIGHTS COMM'N, THE
RIGHTS OF LESBIANS AND GAY MEN IN THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION 52-55 (1994).
170. See PODRABINEK, supra note 157.
171. Id. at 5.
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Beginning in the mid-1940s, a nationwide system of psychiatric hospitals
was assembled to house the politically and socially troublesome."t2
Diagnostic tools were invented such as "sluggish schizophrenia," a mental
illness which included in its classification persons who entertained "delusions
of reformism" or demonstrated other forms of antisocial or antistate
behavior.' The "theoretical basis for punitive medicine" was developed by
further "widening the range of the definition of schizophrenia and social
danger."'
74
Lesbian and gay persons shared in this historic onslaught against
troublesome forms of dissidence. Lesbian women found themselves classified
under the rubric of "sluggish schizophrenia."175 And "homosexuality," in
general, was regarded as a unique threat to both the social fabric and politics
of socialism. 176 Like other social and political dissidents, sexual dissidents
were incarcerated for purposes of psychiatric "rehabilitation" on account of
their so-called crimes, depravities, and sins. Medical technology thus
functioned as the mechanism of repression and "social cleansing.'
177
Supervising officials employed dangerous pharmaceuticals, in particular, to
neutralize dissident behavior by chemically melting it away. For example, in
the former Soviet Union, lesbianism as a symptom of "schizophrenia" could
be met "with such tranquilizers as Majeptil, a drug that has driven some to
suicide. One injection of Sulfazine can literally immobilize a prisoner for three
days. Many are kept on it for months.' 78 Though without mention of lesbian
inmates, a 1992 U.S. State Department dispatch reported the continued use of
these drugs under the new Russian government.1
7 1
172. Id. at 40-41; Tom Dworetzky, Asylum! Psychiatry in the Soviet Union, OMNI, Feb. 1992, at 46,
48.
173. Dworetzky, supra note 172, at 84.
174. PODRABINEK, supra note 157, at 41. During his 30-year reign as head of the system, KGB
Colonel Lunts devised much of this theoretical framework and also single-handedly "declared more than
1,000 sane political prisoners mentally ill" Dworetzky, supra note 172, at 48.
175. GESSEN, supra note 169, at 17-18.
176. Gessen, supra note 116, at 61-62. Gessen also refers to an influential Russian columnist's use
of the cultural aphorism: "Eliminate homosexuality, and you will make fascism disappear." Id. at 61.
177. Former Soviet and present-day Russian officials, unwittingly or openly, acknowledge much of
this indictment. Here are three poignant examples of either blind admission or unapologetic candor. The
former Soviet regime exiled Alexander Podrabinek to Siberia for nearly six months for writing his book,
as a bizarre testament to the accuracy of his account. See John Langone, A Profession Under Stress, TIME,
Apr. 10, 1989, at 94, 95. Second, after the U.S. official investigation and admonishment of post-Vienna
psychiatric conditions, Soviet officials proclaimed that the delegation gave too much credence to statements
of the mentally ill patients. According to their officials, "'it is not the accepted custom to discuss with
patients the methods for treating them, except for cases where a physician is the patient."' Robert Pear,
Report Reproaches Soviet Psychiatry, N.Y. TMES, July 13, 1989, at A3. Third, a Russian hospital director
recently complained that "'our psychiatry has been overly humanized"' in his response to progressive
reform ideas. Cydilo, supra note 169, at 44.
178. Robert Marquand, CHISTAN SCi. MONITOR, Aug. 14, 1984, at 21.
179. See 1991 U.S. DEP'T STATE HUM. RTs. RE'. 1270 (1992).
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Although many of the other social and political dissidents of the Soviet era
have since been released, lesbian and gay persons are still kept behind bars' 80
and within the clamps of punitive medicine.18' Their caretakers are the same
torturers of the past.t82 They are subject to the threat of powerful drugs used
"as a means of intimidation, punishment and deliberate suppression of
nonconformist individuals."' 83 In 1995, for the first time, the U.S. State
Department's Human Rights Report called attention to the plight of Russian
lesbian women being forcibly held as psychiatric inmates and treated with
mind-altering drugs:
[P]olice frequently place lesbians against their will into
psychiatric hospitals after receiving requests from family members or
friends to commit the "patient" to an institution for treatment. The
Moscow Society for Lesbians, Literature, and Art alleges that medical
textbooks in Russia still include materials on clinical treatments for
homosexuality as a mental illness. In psychiatric hospitals, chemical
treatments are prescribed, and lesbians are sometimes beaten if they
refuse treatment, according to the Society which claims the only way
to be discharged is to renounce their sexual orientation."M
These conditions are maintained in violation of Russia's commitments to
Helsinki.
It must not be assumed that these practices are mere aberrational hold-
overs from the Soviet Union. Throughout the twentieth century and in several
countries, a continuum of medicalized state control of lesbian and gay lives has
surfaced-from Nazi policies to U.S. immigration law. The Russian experience
also has exact analogues in contemporary China and Singapore, where even
today authorities conduct the most grotesque forms of medicalized repression.
Moreover, the use of medicine is just one form of persecution selected from
a bazaar of technological mechanisms and official pretexts. In other countries,
the lack of such technology may pose the only significant obstacle to
implementing such an approach. In the meantime, those with the animus for
persecution have access to lethal injection, torture chambers, extrajudicial
180. 1994 U.S. DEP'T STATE HUM. RTS. REP. (1995), available in LEXIS, News Library, Dstate File.
See generally GESSEN, supra note 169 (describing continued incarceration of lesbian and gay persons
despite release and reparations given to other Russian dissidents).
181. Ten years after writing Punitive Medicine, Podrabinek considered purported psychiatric reforms
to be strictly cosmetic: 'The only thing that has changed is the label."' Langone, supra note 177, at 84.
182. Even if they had sufficient resources, hospitals like Serbsky may never live down
their old reputations as torture chambers for one good reason. Many of the doctors
most responsible for the abuses are still running the system. Which means, critics
say, that new laws and good intentions will not be enough to stop the horror stories
for good.
Nightline, supra note 164.
183. N. Safronova, Soviet Psychiatry Still "Mangling" Lives, CuRRENT DIGEST OF THE SOViEr PREsS,
May 2, 1990, at 5.
184. 1994 U.S. DEP'T STATE HUM. RTs. REP., supra note 180, at 936.
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killings, and criminal law in order to decimate the fundamental human rights
of sexual orientation dissidents.
IV. CONCLUSION
[It is time to realize that the incarceration of the liberal-minded
in insane asylums is psychic murder, this is but a variant of the gas
chamber and yet even more cruel, for the torments of the debilitated
are more insidious and more lasting. Just as with the gas chambers,
these crimes will not be forgotten. And all of those involved with
these crimes, no matter when they perpetrated them, will be tried,
both in life and in death.
In both unbridled lawlessness and licentious acts one must be ever
mindful of the limits beyond which a man becomes a cannibal. This
is but a cursory assessment that one can live with only if one
constantly employs force and constantly ignores the objections ofconscience."
This Note has considered asylum determinations under U.S. asylum law's
first prong: the required showing of persecution. Several authoritative sources
invite the incorporation of international human rights standards into these
decisions. This invitation may be viewed as rather commonsensical: If an
applicant establishes a well-founded fear of an international human rights
violation, surely this satisfies the relevant legal requirement. It certainly would
appear illegitimate for an asylum adjudicator to hold that an applicant's
internationally recognized human rights are threatened and yet conclude that
such a harm does not constitute persecution.
International human rights standards offer practitioners and adjudicators a
conceptual framework for both articulating and evaluating claims of
persecution. These standards reflect lengthy deliberations by nation-states,
usually in enlightened proximity to gross human injustice. Those persons
subject to the worst forms of human indecency know the meaning of these
standards with bitter accuracy. For many lesbian and gay persons located
across the earth, this very day is ridden with well-founded fear-the surge of
electric voltage through every bit of muscle, skin, and bone; the reprehensible
taste of toxic regurgitant forced down the throat; the burning-alive sensation
of an antipsychotic drug overdose; or the final terror-stricken thought before
the first lobotomal cut. With this awareness, they share a profound knowledge
of the human ability to transgress the fundamental rights of innocents. If any
of these people can make it to our shores, our laws must offer them safe
haven.
185. ALEXANDER SoLzHENITSYN, THIS IS How WE LIVE, quoted in Alexander Ginzburg, Foreword
to PODRABINEK, supra note 157, at xi.
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